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We empirically investigate ‘hostile’ takeover bids by specifically focusing on whether 
or not the resistance strategy included retaliation with a potentially lethal operational and/or 
financial transaction intended to frustrate the takeover bid and make it likely to fail. More than 
40% of hostile bids in our sample involve such potentially lethal “frustrating” actions. We find 
that a frustrating action is causally linked to worse abnormal stockholder wealth and greater 
likelihood of the CEO being fired subsequent to the bid. Moreover, relative to non-lethal 
managerial resistance, a frustrating action is significantly related to commonly used proxies for 
lower target-firm undervaluation, lower managerial quality, and tighter managerial control. Our 
empirical findings are consistent with potentially lethal resistance strategies being motivated 
more by managerial entrenchment considerations than by the objective of maximizing the 
potential for price improvement for shareholders.  
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Lethality of Managerial Resistance in Hostile Bids 
1. Introduction 
We investigate ‘hostile’ takeover bids by specifically focusing on whether or not the 
resistance strategy included retaliation with potentially lethal operational actions and/or 
financial transactions intended to frustrate the takeover bid and make it likely to fail by making 
the target less attractive and/or more difficult to acquire for the initial bidder. Examples of such 
potentially lethal actions, hereafter labeled as “frustrating” actions, are described by Ruback 
(1987), Dann and DeAngelo (1988), and Berkovitch and Khanna (1990); and can include: (a) 
divestments in which assets of value to the bidder are sought to be sold or spun-off; (b) mergers 
or joint ventures in which the intent is to make the bid problematic from a size, strategic, or 
antitrust perspective; (c) large payouts and share buybacks; (d) competing management 
buyouts; (e) golden parachutes; and (f) ‘white squire’ equity infusions. During the 15 year span 
of our study, 41 percent of hostile bids involved at least one type of frustrating action.  
The resistance strategies used in the remaining 59% of the hostile bids in our sample 
are not structured to fatally derail the bid and make it likely to fail. Even though the associated 
resistance can often be quite severe, it does not block all pathways that can enable a bid to 
succeed. We hereby label these resistance strategies as “non-lethal” managerial resistance. 
They include actions like: (a) releasing financial and strategic information to aid in justifying 
and communicating a higher valuation; (b) lobbying relevant stakeholders; (c) soliciting 
alternative friendly offers; (d) raising antitrust concerns; and (e) undertaking relevant litigation. 
There are bonafide economic motivations for non-lethal resistance. First, it can secure a better 
offer price for shareholders by helping to unlock the value of managerial private information 
that justifies higher valuation, information that may not otherwise be reflected in market prices 
since the information is private. Second, as argued by Ruback (1987), in transactions where 
there is disagreement about value, it can pay to haggle about price, and it can pay to buy more 
time to do so, since the additional time can increase the possibility of competing bidders.  
2 
 
For frustrating actions, a bonafide motivation is that a frustrating action represents 
resistance that is credibly so severe that it can enable managers to extract the maximum possible 
takeover premium for stockholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986a; Stulz, 1988; Berkovitch and 
Khanna, 1990). However, an alternative motivation is the “managerial entrenchment” view, 
i.e., managers resort to a frustrating action because they want the failure of any offer that leads 
to their losing their jobs and the associated private benefits of control (Baron, 1983). 1 This 
paper empirically investigates these conflicting managerial motives for frustrating actions 
during hostile bids.  
 First, we examine if and how the actual abnormal stockholder wealth from a hostile bid 
depends on whether or not the target’s resistance strategy includes a frustrating action. 
Depending on the stockholders’ belief in regard to the motivation for the frustrating action – 
optimally maximize the potential for price improvement, or alternatively remain entrenched in 
their jobs – the abnormal stockholder-wealth effect could arguably be better or worse relative 
to non-lethal  managerial resistance.  
Second, we examine whether or not salient initial-offer and target-firm characteristics 
affect the likelihood that a frustrating action is the target management’s preferred resistance 
strategy.2 We focus on characteristics that proxy for target-firm undervaluation, managerial 
quality, and managerial control. If a frustrating action is the managers’ preferred strategy for 
reason of maximizing potential for price improvement, then it should arguably be associated 
                                                             
1 An insightful illustration of conflicting perspectives is the EUR 26 billion takeover of Arcelor by Mittal 
Steel, one of the most fiercely and bitterly resisted hostile bids in Europe. Arcelor’s resistance strategy 
included: (a) vigorous efforts to ring-fence EUR 4 billion of North American assets not wanted by Mittal, 
thereby making it difficult for Mittal to offload these assets to preempt antitrust concerns; (b) repurchase 
EUR 5 billion of stock; (c) take-over a rival firm, Severstal, in a EUR 13 billion deal; and (d) provide 
Severstal’s CEO with a 32 percent blocking stake (equivalent to 38 percent after the stock repurchase). 
Eventually, the bidder agreeing to Arcelor’s CEO and Board Chair continuing in office after the merger, 
coupled with a 34 percent improvement on the initial offer, prevented these frustrating actions from ending 
the hostile bid. Arcelor had to pay a punitive EUR 140 million fee for terminating the Severstal take-over. 
See: “Mittal Rides Rocky Road to Takeover Arcleor”, Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2006. 
2 We include these as independent variables elsewhere in the analysis along with variables to indicate 
whether or not a hostile bid has multiple bidders, and whether or not a hostile bid fails. We also account for 
unobservable factors (e.g. costs of acquiring information about the target firm and private benefits of 
managerial control) that increase the likelihood of observing resistance during a takeover bid. 
3 
 
to a greater extent with greater target-firm undervaluation compared to  non-lethal managerial 
resistance. Furthermore, if a frustrating action is the managers’ preferred strategy for 
managerial entrenchment reasons, then it should be associated to a greater extent with lower 
managerial quality and greater managerial control, relative to non-lethal managerial resistance.  
Lastly, we examine if the likelihood of the CEO being fired after a hostile bid, i.e., CEO 
turnover, depends on whether or not the resistance strategies included a frustrating action. 
Higher CEO-turnover after a frustrating action (relative to non-lethal managerial resistance) 
should arguably reflect that the frustrating action was perceived as having been misused for 
managerial entrenchment. However, the direction of a CEO-turnover effect of a frustrating 
action should also reflect the strength of adverse information revealed about offending 
managers interdependently with the effectiveness of internal and external disciplinary 
mechanisms after a hostile bid (Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1994). 
 We select the U.K. as the institutional setting for the analysis because of the several 
important advantages it affords over the US for this specific study. First, it gives us the ability 
to study the use of a frustrating action in the absence of any confounding effects of ex ante 
deterrent antitakeover provisions like staggered boards, supermajority amendments, fair price 
amendments, and poison pills. In contrast to the U.S., such provisions are specifically 
precluded, or discouraged to the point of extinction, in the U.K.3  
 Second, the U.K. Takeover Code clearly recognizes and defines a frustrating action in 
the context of a takeover bid, and has special disclosure and approval-related provisions for 
them, albeit enforced during our sample period only through a self-regulatory framework. This 
clearly ensures precision in identifying frustrating actions.  
Third, another major advantage of the UK as the institutional setting for the study is 
that it provides us with a useful exogenous event: incorporation of the recommendations of the 
                                                             
3 This is important because these ex ante deterrant antitakeover provisions make it more likely to outright 
deter a takeover bid (Karpoff, Schonlau, and Wehrly, 2017), and also make it more likely to generate 
managerial resistance during a takeover bid (Carline, Gogineni, and Puthenpurackal, 2019). 
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Cadbury Report concerning internal corporate-governance practice into the listing 
requirements of the London Stock Exchange for fiscal periods after June 1993. In particular, 
the Cadbury reforms made it virtually mandatory for boards of exchange-listed firms to have a 
minimum number of outside independent directors. This led to a substantial increase in the 
representation and influence of outside directors (Dahya and McConnell, 2007; Dahya, 
Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos, 2016). We exploit the Cadbury reforms as a naturally 
exogenous source of variation for the likelihood that a frustrating action is managers’ preferable 
resistance strategy. This has strong validity on the basis of the earlier theoretical debate and 
subsequent empirical analysis. Importantly, this way we are able to make causal inferences 
about whether or not frustrating actions impact abnormal stockholder wealth from a hostile bid 
and CEO turnover after a hostile bid (relative to non-lethal managerial resistance).  
Contrary to theoretical appraisals by Shleifer and Vishny (1986a), Stulz (1988), and 
Berkovitch and Khanna (1990), the statistically and materially significant results that we 
document indicate that, relative to non-lethal managerial resistance, frustrating actions in 
hostile bids are motivated by managerial entrenchment motivations rather than an effort to 
maximize the potential for price improvement. Firstly, when measured over the duration of a 
hostile bid and one year beyond for a failed bid (in the absence of another offer), the abnormal 
stockholder-wealth effect (measured as the market-adjusted return over the final premium) is 
19 percentage-points worse for a frustrating action compared with non-lethal managerial 
resistance. 4 Furthermore, our results indicate that stockholders do not foresee, from as early as 
bid rumors through to bid announcement, the coming of frustrating action; and that the negative 
                                                             
4 We use the actual market-adjusted return over the final premium as the measure of actual abnormal 
stockholder wealth from a hostile bid because, even for a completed bid, stockholders may not be sufficiently 
convinced that the final offer generates the maximum possible takeover premium. Indeed, from regressing 
the actual market-adjusted return on the final premium, we find coefficients of 0.70 (0.61) for all hostile bids 
(only completed bids), both significantly less than one. In further analysis not documented in the paper, we 
find no significant difference between final premiums for hostile bids differentiated by resistance strategies 
that do and do not extend to frustrating actions. However, the change in the premium from the initial offer 




average market-adjusted return around the days when a frustrating action is actually announced 
(documented by Dann and DeAngelo, 1988), substantially understates its wealth-reducing 
effect for stockholders. Secondly, frustrating action is associated to a lesser extent with 
common proxies for greater target-firm undervaluation, and to a greater extent with common 
proxies for lower managerial quality and greater managerial control. Moreover, a hostile bid 
that faces frustrating action is 34 percentage points less likely to have multiple bidders and, in 
the absence of other independent variables, 17 percentage points more likely to fail. Lastly, a 
CEO who retaliates with frustrating action is 27 percentage points more likely to be replaced 
after a hostile bid (for a failed bid, in the absence of another offer for one year). This result 
provides support for theoretical findings by Hirshleifer and Thakor (1994) suggesting that 
adverse information revealed about managers during takeover bids (in our study, through 
misuse of frustrating action for entrenchment) can lead to an abnormally high turnover rate. 
For this to occur, it also suggests that internal and external disciplinary mechanisms are 
reasonably effective after a failed bid. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 situates our contributions within 
the various strands of the related literature. Section 3 describes the sample of hostile bids. 
Section 4 addresses whether or not frustrating action affects abnormal stockholder wealth from 
a hostile bid. Section 5 examines potential determinants of the likelihood that frustrating action 
is managers’ preferred resistance strategy. Section 6 addresses whether or not a frustrating 
action affects the likelihood of CEO turnover after a hostile bid. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Contributions and Related Literature 
In this section we situate the contributions of this paper within the context of the 
different strands of the related extant literature. We first discuss the theoretical models and then 
the empirical evidence. 
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Berkovitch and Khanna (1990) provide a theoretical appraisal of a frustrating action 
when they analyze what they label as ‘value-reducing defensive strategies’. They conclude that 
a frustrating action can be the optimal resistance strategy for maximizing stockholder wealth. 
This is because although a frustrating action is likely to be value-reducing for the initial bidder, 
it does not necessarily make the target firm less valuable, or more difficult to acquire, for 
another bidder. Moreover, the mere threat to retaliate with a more severe form of managerial 
resistance can be sufficient to extract, even from the initial bidder, the highest possible takeover 
premium for stockholders. Therefore, a frustrating action can be the most effective way to 
beneficially unlock the value of information in the hands of only managers and possibly the 
initial bidder.5 Indeed, stockholders are more willing to accept a higher takeover premium, 
especially when it is more costly to acquire information about the target firm (see Fishman, 
1988; Hirshleifer and Titman, 1990). Furthermore, when stockholders are dissatisfied with the 
takeover premium, it can pay to resist over the price and buy time for this purpose (Dimopoulos 
and Sacchetto, 2014; Bates and Becher, 2017). 
 Notwithstanding this economic rationale for a frustrating action, a more severe form of 
resistance has the potential to increase the likelihood that the initial bidder will withdraw; and, 
in the absence of another bidder, to create a pathway for managers to improve their chances of 
holding onto office. Indeed, it is well-known that managers are at high risk of being turned 
over after a completed bid (see Martin and McConnell, 1991; Agrawal and Walkling, 1994; 
Harford, 2003; Kini, Kracaw, and Mian, 2004). Therefore, maximizing potential for price 
improvement is not necessarily the primary managerial motive behind a frustrating action 
during hostile bids. Rather, as Baron (1983) concludes from a theoretical appraisal of resistance 
in general, entrenchment can make managers incapable of agreeing to a takeover bid, 
                                                             
5 Strictly speaking, the theory, which is similar to that by Shleifer and Vishny (1986a), depends on a 
frustrating action that discriminates against the initial bidder (e.g. divestment and acquisition). However, 




irrespective of its worth to stockholders. In this respect, there are two important caveats in the 
theoretical appraisal of a frustrating action by Berkovitch and Khanna (1990). One is that a 
more severe form of resistance is more likely to be misused for entrenchment when managers 
have more to fear from a hostile bid and when managers have more control. The other is that, 
irrespective of the extent of managerial control, managers’ means and motives, good and bad, 
for retaliating with a more severe form of bid resistance are likely to increase with the strength 
of stockholder belief, right or wrong, that the internal corporate-governance is sufficiently 
effective for the benefits of a frustrating action to outweigh the costs arising from its possible 
misuse for entrenchment. 
Extant empirical studies of hostile bids largely consider managers’ decision to resist 
per se (which we label as ‘general hostility’) without regard to the nature of the takeover 
resistance. However, the related theoretical literature discussed above, suggests that the nature 
and severity of managerial resistance is important for understanding the dilemma surrounding 
the means and motives, good and bad, for resistance during a takeover bid. Therefore, what 
makes our study different from extant empirical studies is that it is more about the manner in 
which managers then decide to retaliate; specifically, in the form of two broad strategies: 
frustrating actions intended to torpedo the bid, and non-lethal managerial resistance. The 
contributions that we generate in this context are discussed below.  
Firstly, Schwert (2000) and Bates and Becher (2017) conclude that managers 
essentially show general hostility to a takeover bid for stockholder advantage rather than as a 
ploy for their own ends.6 However, our new findings suggest a divide in managerial motives 
behind resistance during a takeover bid. That is, although our findings provide some support 
for the suggestion that general hostility is motivated by greater target-firm undervaluation, and, 
by implication, by maximizing potential for price improvement (see Jennings and Mazzeo, 
                                                             
6 Franks and Harris (1996) reach much the same conclusion for UK hostile bids that predate those in our 
sample.   
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1993; Bates and Becher, 2017), these motives would seem to distinctly matter less for managers 
that then go on to retaliate with a frustrating action. Moreover, although we find some support 
for the suggestion that general hostility is also motivated by lower managerial quality, and, by 
implication, by misuse for entrenchment (see Mørck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988), these 
motives would seem to distinctly matter more for managers that then go on to retaliate with 
frustrating action. Given that 41 percent of hostile bids in our sample face at least one type of 
frustrating action, this divide is important to addressing the dilemma surrounding managerial 
means and motives, good and bad, for resistance. 
Secondly, we find that the divide in motives is also apparent in the context of the extent 
of managerial control. Extant empirical studies find that the extent of managerial control affects 
takeover decisions and takeover outcomes for stockholders (see Mikkelson and Partch, 1989; 
Shivdasani, 1993; Cotter and Zenner, 1994; Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner, 1997; Moeller, 
2005; Jenter and Lewellen, 2015). However, few studies consider whether or not the extent of 
managerial control affects the likelihood of resistance during a takeover bid. Although we find 
some support for the suggestion that general hostility is motivated by greater managerial 
control, and, by implication, by misuse for entrenchment (see Cotter and Zenner, 1994), these 
motives would also seem to distinctly matter more for managers that then go on to retaliate 
with a frustrating action. However, independent of the extent of managerial control, we find 
that (the Cadbury) reforms of internal corporate-governance strengthen managers’ means and 
motives, good and bad, for preferring to retaliate with a frustrating action. This finding gains 
support from our earlier discussion of the related theoretical literature. 
Thirdly, by differentiating between resistance strategies that include a frustrating action 
and those that do not, we also generate contributions in the context of the empirical literature 
that examines expected and actual abnormal stockholder wealth from a hostile bid (Huang and 
Walkling, 1987; Schwert, 2000), managerial turnover after a completed bid (Martin and 
McConnell, 1991; Agrawal and Walkling, 1994; Harford, 2003; Kini, et al, 2004), and 
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managerial turnover after a failed bid (Denis and Serrano, 1996; Bates and Becher, 2017). 
Although the overall average for actual abnormal stockholder wealth from hostile bids in our 
sample is 24 percent (which is in line with extant empirical studies), the wealth effect is 19 
percentage-points worse for frustrating action than compared to only less severe types of 
managerial resistance. However, we find no evidence to suggest that stockholders foresee the 
coming of frustrating action, from as early as bid rumors through to bid announcement. Along 
with our earlier contributions, these new findings support a stockholder conviction that the 
frustrating action was managers’ preferable resistance strategy for reasons of misuse for 
entrenchment. That said, although the overall CEO-turnover rate after hostile bids in our 
sample is 45 percent, the turnover effect is 38 (20) percentage-points greater for a frustrating 
action relative to non-lethal managerial resistance within one year of a failed bid (straight after 
a completed bid). For this to occur, it supports findings by Denis and Serrano (1996) that 
internal and external disciplinary mechanisms are sufficiently effective even after a failed bid. 
However, they only find evidence suggesting that an abnormally high turnover rate after failed 
bids is in response to adverse information already known about managers. Our finding suggests 
that it is also in response to adverse information revealed about offending managers during 
takeover bids (in the study, through misuse of frustrating action for entrenchment).  
 Fourthly, several extant empirical studies examine abnormal stockholder wealth and 
managerial turnover confined to individual types of frustrating actions (Dann and DeAngelo, 
1988; Klein and Rosenfeld, 1988; Denis, 1990; Heron and Lie, 2006). However, our study is 
the first to collectively examine all types of frustrating actions during hostile bids. We find that 
market-adjusted returns are overwhelmingly negative, both collectively and for each type of 
frustrating action, which provides support for findings by Dann and DeAngelo (1988) 
suggesting that stockholders expect a frustrating action to make their firm less valuable, or 
more difficult to acquire, for the initial bidder. However, our new finding is that an average 
market-adjusted return confined to the days when frustrating action is actually announced 
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materially understates its wealth-reducing effect for stockholders, when measured throughout 
the duration of a hostile bid, and beyond for a failed bid; and when specifically benchmarked 
against non-lethal managerial resistance. Furthermore, similar to Klein and Rosenfeld (1988) 
and Denis (1990), we find a high managerial-turnover rate after a frustrating action. However, 
our new finding is that the turnover rate is abnormally high when specifically benchmarked 
against non-lethal managerial resistance. Most importantly, by exploiting reforms of internal 
corporate-governance practice, we are able to conclude that the negative stockholder-wealth 
effect and positive CEO-turnover effect of frustrating actions are almost certainly causal effects.   
 Lastly, Dimopoulos and Sacchetto (2014) generate structural estimates for the severity 
of managerial resistance that are positively determined by the takeover premium for 
stockholders. Like us, they find that the severity of managerial resistance is positively 
associated with common proxies for greater managerial control. However, the findings from 
our different approach to capturing the severity of managerial resistance independently of the 
takeover premium for stockholders – differentiating between frustrating actions and non-lethal 
managerial resistance – are suggestive of more severe bid resistance being motivated more by 
misuse for entrenchment than by maximizing potential for price improvement. 
 
3. Sample of hostile bids  
 In this section we describe the sample of hostile bids. We present and discuss time-
series data for hostile bids in Section 3.1, descriptive statistics for bid and target-firm 
characteristics in Section 3.2, and summary data for frustrating action in Section 3.3. 
3.1 Hostile bids 
 To construct the sample of hostile bids, we begin with takeover offers for more than 50 
percent control of UK target firms included in the Securities Data Corporation database as 
announced between July 1, 1989 and December 31, 2003. We then use the Corporate Register 
(published first in March 1989 and thereafter at least twice a year) to exclude takeover offers 
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for target firms not listed on the London Stock Exchange, and primarily from more-regulated 
industries: financials, utilities, telecommunications, broadcasting, newspapers, and public 
transport. 
In the absence of a previous offer for at least 1 year, a takeover bid in our sample begins 
from as early as rumors, before proceeding to announcement of the initial offer. Similar to an 
empirical procedure used by Bates and Becher (2017), a takeover bid then extends to other 
offers, each successively separated by no more than 1 year, until completed or reported as 
having failed. Merging offers in this way ensures that, irrespective of whether or not a takeover 
bid fails, we measure actual abnormal stockholder wealth from a hostile bid, and capture CEO 
turnover after a hostile bid, in the absence of another offer for at least 1 year. We carry out 
these screening and merging procedures using the Regulatory News Service (RNS) of the 
London Stock Exchange. In keeping with extant empirical studies, a takeover bid is hostile in 
our sample when the RNS reports that managers publicly reject (resist) the initial offer. 
We present time-series data for hostile bids in Table 1. The time-series data in Panel A 
shows that hostile bids makeup 16.41 percent of all (792) takeover bids. After the Cadbury 
reforms of internal corporate-governance practice came into effect during 1993, there is a 
noticeable and sustained fall in the annual percentages of takeover bids that are hostile. 
However, this understates the continuing economic importance of hostile bids. The time-series 
data in Panel B shows that, overall, hostile bids makeup 31.66 percent of real (2003) GBP 
392,711.67 million aggregate values (sizes) of target firms. That is, hostile bids are, in the main, 
associated with larger target firms than compared to other bids. Moreover, unlike in Panel A, 
there is no sustained fall in the annual percentages of takeover bids that are hostile after the 
Cadbury reforms. Therefore, firm size would seem to be a persistent determinant of managers’ 
means to show general hostility to a takeover bid. 
3.2 Bid and target-firm characteristics         
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 We present descriptive statistics for bid and target-firm characteristics in Table 2; and 
provide definitions for these variables, all of which are salient in the context of the related 
empirical literature, in Table A1 of the Appendix. For the variables for bid characteristics, the 
overall averages for expected and actual abnormal stockholder wealth from hostile bids are 
23.48 and 24.47 percent, respectively. However, in comparing the spreads for these variables, 
the standard deviation is roughly twice as large for the second. For the analysis that begins in 
the next section, results are, in the main, not affected by whether or not we use market-adjusted 
returns or benchmark returns against a market model estimated before bid rumors. Moreover, 
results are, in the main, not affected by whether or not we winsorize abnormal returns, and 
other applicable variables. Although we also measure initial premiums from before rumors, 
average expected abnormal stockholder wealth is lower in comparison, and by a percentage 
difference roughly equal to the overall failure rate for hostile bids of 31.54 percent. Furthermore, 
the overall CEO-turnover rate after hostile bids is 44.63 percent, while the overall rate for 
multiple bidders during hostile bids is 19.23 percent. These main descriptive statistics are in 
line with extant empirical studies.      
For the variables related to information asymmetry and the proxies for the extent of 
managerial quality and managerial control, we measure and capture these target-firm 
characteristics before bid rumors. We subsequently change to a natural logarithmic structural 
specification for firm size. Moreover, results are, in the main, not affected by whether our firm-
performance proxies for the extent of managerial quality are left raw or industry-adjusted. 
Because of different findings in extant empirical studies, we examine linear, curvilinear, and 
nonlinear structural specifications for certain proxies for the extent of managerial control: CEO 
age, CEO stockholding, and directors’ aggregate stockholding. However, none of our proxies 
for the extent of managerial control are directly affected by the Cadbury reforms of internal 
corporate-governance practice. In particular, the Cadbury reforms also made it almost 
mandatory for the board not to be chaired by the CEO, but not specifically for the board to be 
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chaired by an outside (independent) and reputable (derived from holding at least one other 
directorship of an exchange-listed firm) director. 
3.3 Frustrating action                
 We present summary data for frustrating action in Table 3. Using the RNS, we 
differentiate between frustrating action and only less severe types of managerial resistance 
during hostile bids. Unlike frustrating action, less severe types of managerial resistance do not 
extend to intentions to retaliate with obstructive operational actions and financial transactions. 
Rather, less severe types of managerial resistance amount, in the main, to releasing financial 
and strategic information, lobbying stakeholders, raising antitrust concerns, litigation, and 
solicitation of another offer (including from a white knight). Litigation is generally conceded 
to be a less severe type of managerial resistance in extant theoretical and empirical studies, but 
is comparatively rare during UK hostile bids. It is common for managers to retaliate with at 
least one type of frustrating action during the timespan of our study, but, overall, not quite as 
common as only resorting to less severe types of bid resistance. Specifically, the overall rate 
for at least one type of frustrating action during hostile bids is 40.77 percent. 
However, managers quite often retaliate with more than one type of frustrating action 
during hostile bids. Managers frequently retaliate by spinning-off and selling-off crown-jewel 
assets. This divestment type of frustrating action is resorted to during 20.00 percent of hostile 
bids. Furthermore, during 13.08 percent of hostile bids, managers retaliate with an acquisition 
type of frustrating action: making a pacman offer for the initial bidder, taking-over another firm 
or purchasing its assets, and creating a joint venture. Managers less frequently retaliate by 
repurchasing stock and paying a special dividend. This payout type of frustrating action is 
resorted to during 6.15 percent of hostile bids. However, managers rarely retaliate with the 
following types of frustrating action. Firstly, a golden parachute, which is resorted to during 
3.85 percent of hostile bids. Secondly, a management buyout, which is also resorted to during 
3.85 percent of hostile bids. Lastly, a white squire (blocking stake, as distinct from solicitation 
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of a white-knight offer), which is resorted to during 3.08 percent of hostile bids. It is widely-
accepted in extant theoretical and empirical studies that these types of intentions to retaliate 
with obstructive operational actions and financial transactions have the capability to make the 
target firm less valuable and more difficult to acquire for the initial bidder.  
 
4. Does a frustrating action affect abnormal stockholder wealth from a hostile bid? 
For results (not tabulated) contained to the days when frustrating action is actually 
announced and for which there are no confounding announcements, an average market-
adjusted return is -2.16 percent for all (first and subsequent) intentions and -2.48 percent when 
we restrict the days to only first intentions. These wealth-reducing effects of frustrating action 
are statistically significant (at the 1 percent level) and consistent with empirical findings by 
Dann and DeAngelo (1988). Moreover, market-adjusted returns are overwhelmingly negative, 
both collectively and for each type of frustrating action. These results provide support for 
theoretical findings by Shleifer and Vishny (1986a), Stulz (1988), and Berkovitch and Khanna 
(1990) suggesting that, in the main, stockholders expect frustrating action to make their firm 
less valuable, or more difficult to acquire, for the initial bidder.  
However, Shleifer and Vishny (1986a), Stulz (1988), and Berkovitch and Khanna 
(1990) go on to suggest that because frustrating action, or the threat of such, is a more severe 
form of resistance, it can be the optimal managerial strategy for extracting the maximum 
possible takeover premium for stockholders. Indeed, our estimate for the stockholder-wealth 
effect of frustrating action could arguably be misstated for several interrelated reasons. Firstly, 
we do not consider the possibility that stockholders have some foresight, from as early as bid 
rumors, about the coming of frustrating action. Secondly, we do not measure the stockholder-
wealth effect of frustrating action throughout the duration of a hostile bid and beyond for a 
failed bid. Lastly, we do not relate the stockholder-wealth effect to that of managerial resistance 
without frustrating action, and do not account for differences in bid and target-firm 
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characteristics. We address these concerns in this section. The empirical analysis is similar to 
that of Huang and Walkling (1987) and Schwert (2000), except that in these studies it is for the 
effect of general hostility on expected and actual abnormal stockholder wealth, respectively, 
from a takeover bid. 
We present and discuss results (coefficients induced by a one-unit change in each of 
the variables) from standard linear regressions, for expected and actual abnormal stockholder 
wealth from a hostile bid, in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively; and from instrumental variable 
(IV) linear regressions in Section 4.3, wherein the variable of main interest, for whether or not 
a hostile bid faces at least one type of frustrating action, is subsequently treated as a potentially 
suspect endogenous variable. For all regressions, we include the full set of variables for initial-
offer and target-firm characteristics, as well as always controlling for then primary industries 
of target firms.7 The results from standard regressions are, in the main, not affected by whether 
or not we also control for announcement years of hostile bids. Lastly, we add the variables for 
multiple bidders and a failed bid, but only to regressions for actual abnormal stockholder wealth 
from a hostile bid because these variables are not ex-ante with respect to expected abnormal 
stockholder wealth. 
4.1 Expected stockholder-wealth effect 
We present results from standard linear regressions for expected abnormal stockholder 
wealth from a hostile bid in Table 4. CEO age, CEO stockholding, and directors’ aggregate 
stockholding all have linear, curvilinear, and nonlinear (natural logarithmic) structural 
specifications in Columns (1) to (3), respectively. The regression in Column (4), upon which 
we base the discussion, combines the strongest of these structural specifications for each of 
these variables.  
                                                             
7 We combine industries into four groups: oil & gas and basic materials; industrials, including technology 
hardware & equipment; consumer goods and healthcare; and consumer services, including software & 
computers services.  
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For the variable of main interest, the result shows that stockholders do not expect the 
wealth effect of frustrating action to be significantly different from the wealth effect of only 
less severe types of managerial resistance. At this point, there are two plausible explanations 
for this finding. One is that stockholders do not foresee the coming of frustrating action, from 
as early as bid rumors through to bid announcement. Alternatively, stockholders do, in fact, 
have some foresight about this, but are neither sufficiently convinced that frustrating action is 
the optimal resistance strategy for maximizing their abnormal wealth from a hostile bid, nor 
sufficiently convinced that it is to be misused for managerial entrenchment. 
4.2 Actual stockholder-wealth effect 
We present results from standard linear regressions for actual abnormal stockholder 
wealth from a hostile bid in Table 5. CEO age, CEO stockholding, and directors’ aggregate 
stockholding all have linear, curvilinear, and nonlinear (natural logarithmic) structural 
specifications in Columns (1) to (3), respectively. The regression in Column (4), upon which 
we base the discussion, combines the strongest of these structural specifications for each of 
these variables. 
For the variable of main interest, the result shows that the actual stockholder-wealth 
effect of frustrating action is 19.13 percentage-points worse than compared to the actual 
stockholder-wealth effect of only less severe types of managerial resistance. This wealth-
reducing effect of frustrating action is statistically significant (at the 5 percent level) and, 
relative to the overall average for actual abnormal stockholder wealth from hostile bids, 
economically substantial. Therefore, an average market-adjusted return contained to the days 
when frustrating action is actually announced would seem to materially understate its wealth-
reducing effect for stockholders. This finding also suggests that stockholders do not foresee the 
coming of frustrating action, from as early as bid rumors through to bid announcement. 
However, when frustrating action is actually announced, stockholders become increasingly 
convinced over the remaining duration of a hostile bid and 1 year beyond for a failed bid (in 
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the absence of another offer) that, in the main, it was misused for managerial entrenchment. 
Therefore, this would seem to be contrary to theoretical findings for frustrating action by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986a), Stulz (1988), and Berkovitch and Khanna (1990).   
The actual wealth-reducing effect of frustrating action is after we account for significant 
effects of the other variables. In particular, the positive effects of initial premium, whether or 
not the initial offer is of cash-only, and firm size. However, whether or not a hostile bid has 
multiple bidders, and whether or not a hostile bid fails, makes no significant difference for 
actual abnormal stockholder wealth. 
4.3 Endogeneity 
 By not treating the variable of main interest as endogenous, we may be biasing the 
actual stockholder-wealth effect of frustrating action. Of particular concern is the possibility 
that reverse causation is upwardly biasing (overstating) the actual wealth-reducing effect of 
frustrating action. That is, in anticipation of an otherwise below maximum possible takeover 
premium, frustrating action may be the optimal managerial strategy for maximizing actual 
abnormal stockholder wealth from a hostile bid because it is more severe than compared to 
only other types of resistance. Indeed, providing support for theoretical findings by Fishman 
(1988) and Hirshleifer and Titman (1990), the results from standard regressions suggest that, 
in the main, stockholders react more favorably to a higher initial premium. 
 To address this concern, and other potential issues concerning endogeneity (e.g. bias 
induced by not accounting for unobservable factors), we present results from an IV linear 
regression for actual abnormal stockholder wealth from a hostile bid in Table 6, by otherwise 
replicating the standard regression in Column (4) of Table 5. Since the variable of main interest 
is binary in nature, we intermediately estimate probabilities of frustrating action from a probit 
regression for the likelihood that, for reasons of maximizing stockholder wealth and misuse for 
entrenchment, it is managers’ preferable resistance strategy. For this intermediate regression 
(results from which are average marginal effects induced by a one-unit change in each of the 
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variables) in Column (1) of Table 6, we include all the other variables, and controls, in the 
standard regression. In addition, we exploit the Cadbury reforms of internal corporate-
governance practice as a naturally exogenous source of variation, with strong theoretical 
validity, for estimating the probabilities of frustrating action.8  
The result for this post-Cadbury variable, for whether or not it is mandatory for the 
target firm to comply with the reforms before bid rumors, shows that it also has strong empirical 
validity, in that the probability of frustrating action is significantly higher after the Cadbury 
reforms than compared to before them. A plausible explanation for this finding is that managers 
regard the Cadbury reforms as a means of more effectively conveying, genuinely and as a ploy, 
to stockholders that the benefits of frustrating action outweigh the costs arising from its 
possible misuse for entrenchment. Consistent with theoretical caveats by Berkovitch and 
Khanna (1990), this, in the main, strengthens managers’ means and motives, good and bad, for 
preferring to retaliate with frustrating action; and independently of the extent of their control, 
which we account for with the other variables. 
Applying an econometric approach endorsed by Angrist and Pischke (2009, pp. 190-
192), we then use the estimated probabilities of frustrating action as an instrumental variable 
in the IV regression in Column (2) of Table 6.9 Strongly supported by a first-stage test of 
instrument validity (an F-statistic well in excess of a recommended minimum threshold of 10), 
the result for a now-instrumented variable of main interest also shows an actual stockholder-
wealth effect of frustrating action that is negative and significant. Most importantly, we are 
able to conclude that the actual wealth-reducing effect of frustrating action is almost certainly 
a causal effect in the standard regression, but not in a reverse sense.  
                                                             
8  Dahya, et al (2016) exploit the Cadbury reforms for use directly as an instrumental variable when 
examining the influence of outside directors on bidder returns. However, we exploit the Cadbury reforms in 
the intermediate regression, before then proceeding to the IV regression. Again, this is because, unlike theirs, 
our potentially suspect endogenous variable is binary in nature.    
9 Because of the intermediate regression, we do not tabulate the first-stage of the IV regression. The results 
are, in the main, not affected by whether we use two-stage least squares, limited-information maximum 
likelihood, or a generalized method of moments estimator. 
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To also be certain about the expected stockholder-wealth effect of frustrating action, 
we apply the same approach in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6, by otherwise replicating the 
standard regression in Column (4) of Table 4. Again, strongly supported by a first-stage test of 
instrument validity, the result for a now-instrumented variable of main interest also shows an 
expected stockholder-wealth effect of frustrating action that is not significant. However, a Chi2 
test of endogeneity is only significant for the IV regression for actual abnormal stockholder 
wealth from a hostile bid. 
 
5. Why is a frustrating action likely to be managers’ preferred resistance strategy?                    
 The ex-post evidence that we document in the previous section suggests that 
stockholders are not convinced that frustrating action was the optimal resistance strategy for 
maximizing their abnormal wealth from a hostile bid, but are convinced that, in the main, it 
was misused for managerial entrenchment. To establish whether or not there is ex-ante support 
for this stockholder conviction, in this section we examine, in a more systematic way than was 
possible in the confines of an instrumental-variable regression, potential determinants of the 
likelihood that frustrating action is managers’ preferable resistance strategy.  
We include the variables for initial-offer characteristics and those related to information 
asymmetry as proxies for the extent of target-firm undervaluation, and, by implication, for 
potential for price improvement. Greater target-firm undervaluation could arguably strengthen 
managers’ means and motives for preferring to retaliate with frustrating action for reasons of 
maximizing stockholder wealth. This is because a more severe form of managerial resistance 
can be optimal for extracting the maximum possible takeover premium for stockholders, as is 
suggested from theoretical findings for frustrating action by Shleifer and Vishny (1986a), Stulz 
(1988), and Berkovitch and Khanna (1990).  
We also include the variables for the other target-firm characteristics as proxies for the 
extent of managerial quality and managerial control. Lower managerial quality and greater 
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managerial control could arguably strengthen managers’ means and motives for preferring to 
retaliate with frustrating action for reasons of misuse for entrenchment. This is because a more 
severe form of resistance can also be misused for entrenchment, especially by managers with 
more to fear from a hostile bid and by managers with more control, as is suggested from 
theoretical caveats for frustrating action by Berkovitch and Khanna (1990). 
 We present and discuss results (average marginal effects induced by a one-unit change 
in each of the variables) from standard probit regressions, for the likelihood that frustrating 
action is managers’ preferable resistance strategy, in Section 5.1; and from a probit regression 
with sample selection in Section 5.2, wherein unobservable factors that increase the likelihood 
of observing resistance during a takeover bid are subsequently taken into account. For all 
regressions, we control for then primary industries of target firms, but, because of the addition 
of the variable for the Cadbury reforms, do not also control for announcement years of hostile 
bids. Lastly, the variables for multiple bidders and a failed bid are excluded from regressions 
in this section because these bid characteristics are not ex-ante with respect to whether or not 
a hostile bid faces at least one type of frustrating action. 
5.1 Standard likelihood model 
We present results from standard probit regressions for the likelihood that frustrating 
action is managers’ preferable resistance strategy in Table 7. CEO age, CEO stockholding, and 
directors’ aggregate stockholding all have linear, curvilinear, and nonlinear (natural 
logarithmic) structural specifications in Columns (1) to (3), respectively. The regression in 
Column (4), upon which we base the discussion, combines the strongest of these structural 
specifications for each of these variables. 
For initial-offer characteristics, the results show that the probability of frustrating action 
is 16.58 percentage-points higher when the initial premium is increased by one standard 
deviation. Furthermore, the probability of frustrating action is 16.46 percentage-points lower 
when the initial offer is of cash-only than compared to when this is not the case. Since managers 
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are less likely to show general hostility to a takeover bid when the initial premium is higher 
(see Jennings and Mazzeo, 1993), and especially when it is abnormally higher (see Bates and 
Becher, 2017), a plausible assumption is that, ceteris paribus, the higher is the initial premium, 
the lesser is the extent to which it undervalues the target firm. Moreover, empirical findings by 
Malmendier, Opp, and Saidi (2016) suggest that a cash-only offer is a stronger signal that the 
bidder regards the target firm to be undervalued to a greater extent. Therefore, these effects 
suggest that frustrating action is associated to a lesser extent with greater target-firm 
undervaluation, and, by implication, with greater potential for price improvement, than 
compared to only less severe types of managerial resistance. 
Nor do our findings for information asymmetry suggest that greater target-firm 
undervaluation strengthens managers’ means and motives for preferring to retaliate with 
frustrating action for reasons of maximizing stockholder wealth. A plausible assumption is that, 
ceteris paribus, a target firm that was only recently exchange-listed and a target firm with more 
financial slack are more susceptible to undervaluation associated with information asymmetry 
(see Jennings and Mazzeo, 1993). For the variables related to information asymmetry, the 
results show that the probability of frustrating action is 44.84 percentage-points lower when 
the target firm was only recently exchange-listed than compared to when this is not the case. 
Furthermore, the probability of frustrating action is 10.42 percentage-points lower when the 
target firm’s cash-to-assets ratio is increased by one standard deviation. 
 In contrast, our findings suggest that frustrating action is associated to a greater extent 
with lower managerial quality than compared to only less severe types of bid resistance. A 
plausible assumption is that the extent of managerial quality is reflected in the performance of 
the target firm, and that, ceteris paribus, managers of a poorly-performing target firm have 
more to fear from a hostile bid (see Mørck, et al, 1988; Shivdasani, 1993). For the proxies for 
the extent of managerial quality, the results show that the probability of frustrating action is 
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19.93 percentage-points lower when the target firm’s asset-turnover ratio is increased by one 
standard deviation.    
Moreover, our findings suggest that, in the main, greater managerial control also 
strengthens managers’ means and motives for preferring to retaliate with frustrating action for 
reasons of misuse for entrenchment. For the proxies for the extent of managerial control, the 
results show an inverted curvilinear relationship between the probability of frustrating action 
and CEO age that peaks for middle-aged managers. This relationship gains support from 
findings in extant empirical studies suggesting that managerial preference for control increases 
with age (see Serfling, 2014), but decreases as managers approach retirement-age (see Jenter 
and Lewellen, 2015). The supplementary results (predictive margins and contrasts in predictive 
margins) that we present in Table 8 show the relationship in more detail. In Panel B of Table 
8, the supplementary results show that the changes in the probability of frustrating action 
induced by successive two-unit changes in CEO age are positive for ages from 38 to 52, not 
significantly different from zero for ages from 52 to 60, and negative for ages from 60 to 66.  
Furthermore, the results in Table 7 make no suggestion of there being curvilinear 
relationships between the probability of frustrating action and stockholdings of the CEO and 
the directors. However, the probability of frustrating action is 28.10 (46.87) percentage-points 
higher (lower) when the CEO stockholding (directors’ aggregate stockholding) is increased by 
one standard deviation. These relationships gain support from findings in extant empirical 
studies suggesting that managerial control increases with the stockholding of the CEO, but 
decreases with the aggregate stockholding of the directors. Moeller (2005) finds that larger 
CEO stockholdings have adversely affected takeover premiums since the 1990s, which is a 
reverse of earlier times when larger CEO stockholdings had tended to benefit takeover 
outcomes for stockholders (see Mikkelson and Partch, 1989). Cotter and Zenner (1994) find 
that managers are less likely to show general hostility to a takeover bid when a larger directors’ 
aggregate stockholding aligns the interests of directors more to those of stockholders. 
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Furthermore, a plausible assumption is that, ceteris paribus, managerial control is 
weaker in the presence of the following. Firstly, a strong outside and reputable presence on the 
board (see Cotter, et al, 1997). The results show that the probability of frustrating action is 
16.65 percentage-points lower when the board is chaired by an outside (independent) and 
reputable (derived from holding at least one other directorship of an exchange-listed firm) 
director than compared to when this is not the case. Secondly, a larger board, and, by 
implication, a board more difficult for managers to contain, irrespective of whether or not a 
larger board is otherwise less optimal (see Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008). The results show 
that the probability of frustrating action is 11.89 percentage-points lower when the board’s size 
is increased by one standard deviation. Thirdly, a board split over whether or not to resist; in 
particular, because of an interlocking bidder director (see Cotter, et al, 1997). The results show 
that the probability of frustrating action is 32.07 percentage-points lower when the board is 
split over whether or not to resist than compared to when this is not the case. Lastly, an 
ownership structure with a larger aggregation of outside blockholdings (see Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986b; Shivdasani, 1993). The results show that the probability of frustrating action is 
22.20 percentage-points higher when the aggregate outside blockholdings (each of at least 5 
percent of the outstanding stock) are increased by one standard deviation. 
These effects are statistically significant (to at least the 5 percent level) and, relative to 
the overall rate for at least one type frustrating action during hostile bids, materially substantial. 
Moreover, the effects on the probability of frustrating action are after we account for firm size 
and the Cadbury reforms of internal corporate-governance practice. 
5.2 Likelihood model with sample selection 
 We make no claims that the effects on the probability of frustrating action are causal 
effects. However, there is the possibility that the effects are misrepresented because we do not 
account for unobservable factors that increase the likelihood of observing managerial resistance 
during a takeover bid. That is, because of these unobservable factors, we are observing some 
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hostile bids that would not be hostile on the basis only of the variables, and controls, included 
in the standard likelihood model. The unobservable factors are conceivably related to the costs 
of acquiring information about the target firm (see Fishman, 1988) and private benefits of 
managerial control (see Baron, 1983); increased costs and benefits of which may then make it 
more likely that frustrating action is managers’ preferable resistance strategy, but for reasons 
of maximizing stockholder wealth and misuse for entrenchment, respectively. However, our 
ultimate concern is that information-acquisition cost and private benefits of control are 
potentially correlated with, and, by implication, misrepresenting, the effects on the probability 
of frustrating action that are suggestive of the extent of target-firm undervaluation and the 
extent of managerial quality and managerial control, respectively. 
 To address this concern, we present results from a probit regression with sample 
selection for the likelihood that frustrating action is managers’ preferable resistance strategy in 
Table 9, by otherwise replicating the standard regression in Column (4) of Table 7. We first 
estimate aggregate unobservable factors that when increased increase the likelihood that 
managers will show general hostility to a takeover bid. For this first-stage, for whether or not 
managers publicly reject (resist) the initial offer, in Column (1) of Table 9, we include all the 
variables (including that for the Cadbury reforms), and controls, in the standard regression, 
except for the split-board variable because whether or not the board is split over resisting is 
only observable when managers show general hostility to a takeover bid. However, for the first-
stage only, we change to the curvilinear structural specification for the directors’ aggregate 
stockholding because this is the strongest structural specification for this variable in the context 
of all takeover bids (not only those that are hostile).  
In addition, for estimating the aggregate unobservable factors, we use two new 
variables plausibly related to the probability of general hostility, but not to the probability of 
frustrating action. The first is whether or not a takeover bid begins with rumors, while the other 
is whether or not the initial offer is mandatory because the bidder acquired a stake of, or raised 
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its toehold to, at least 30 percent of the outstanding stock. In the main, bid rumors signal that 
an approach was rebuffed by managers, and, by implication, make it more likely that the initial 
offer will also be publicly rejected by them. However, bid rumors have no obvious implications 
for influencing the manner in which managers will then decide to retaliate. In the main, a 
mandatory initial offer is associated with an unsolicited bid, and, by implication, is more likely 
to increase the probability of general hostility. However, a mandatory initial offer also has no 
obvious implications for then influencing the probability of frustrating action. The results for 
these variables show that both are, indeed, positively related to the probability of general 
hostility. However, only the first has strong empirical validity, in that the relationship is 
significant. 
 For the other variables included in the first-stage, the results show significant effects of 
the initial premium and whether or not the initial offer is of cash-only that are negative and 
positive, respectively. These results suggest that, in the main, the probability of general hostility 
increases with the extent of target-firm undervaluation, and, by implication, with potential for 
price improvement. This provides support for empirical findings by Jennings and Mazzeo 
(1993) and Bates and Becher (2017). However, only, perhaps, the significant negative effect 
of the target firm’s leverage suggests likewise because, in the main, the probability of general 
hostility would seem to decrease with information asymmetry. This provides support for 
empirical findings by Jennings and Mazzeo (1993).  
Furthermore, providing support for empirical findings by Mørck, et al (1988), there is 
some suggestion that the probability of general hostility decreases with the extent of managerial 
quality, in that the effect of the target firm’s stock performance is significantly negative. 
However, apart from the probability of general hostility peaking for a middle-aged CEO, and 
a mostly positive effect of the directors’ aggregate stockholding providing support for 
empirical findings by Cotter and Zenner (1994), no other effects are significant to suggest that, 
in the main, the probability of general hostility increases with the extent of managerial control. 
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That said, as was earlier suggested by the time-series data for hostile bids, the probability of 
general hostility is significantly lower after the Cadbury reforms of internal corporate-
governance practice than compared to before them. Moreover, this is now after we also account 
for firm size, the significant positive effect of which suggests that it is overarching for managers’ 
means and motives, good and bad, for resistance during a takeover bid. This provides support 
for empirical findings by Schwert (2000). 
A Chi2 test for then including the estimated aggregate unobservable factors in the 
second-stage, for the probability of frustrating action, in Column (2) of Table 9 is not 
significant. Moreover, the effects of the variables on the probability of frustrating action are, 
in the main, not affected by whether or not we include the estimated aggregate unobservable 
factors. This includes the significant positive effect of the Cadbury reforms of internal 
corporate-governance practice, and the effect of firm size that continues not to be significant. 
Most importantly, our findings from the likelihood model with sample selection suggest that 
possible reasons, maximizing stockholder wealth and misuse for entrenchment, for making it 
more likely that managers will show general hostility to a takeover bid, manifest as distinctly 
being more entrenchment-orientated when it then comes to reasoning why frustrating action is 
more likely to be their preferable resistance strategy. 
 
6. Does a frustrating action affect the likelihood of CEO turnover after a hostile bid? 
The ex-ante evidence that we document in the previous section supports a stockholder 
conviction that, in the main, frustrating action was misused for managerial entrenchment. That 
said, it is important to recall that we find no evidence to suggest that stockholders foresee, from 
as early as bid rumors, the coming of frustrating action.  
Since frustrating action is likely to be managers’ preferable resistance strategy for 
reasons of entrenchment, and since, in the main, frustrating action reveals adverse information 
about managers, misuse of it could arguably lead to offenders having an abnormally high 
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likelihood of being replaced after a hostile bid. Alternatively, misuse of frustrating action for 
entrenchment could lead to offending managers improving their chances of holding onto office 
relative to managers only resorting to less severe types of bid resistance. Inevitably therefore, 
the direction of any CEO-turnover effect of frustrating action should have implications for the 
strength of adverse information revealed about managers and the effectiveness of internal and 
external disciplinary mechanisms after a hostile bid (see Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1994). Given 
that all managers are more likely to be turned over after a completed bid (see Martin and 
McConnell, 1991; Agrawal and Walkling, 1994; Harford, 2003; Kini, et al, 2004) than 
compared to after a failed bid (see Denis and Serrano, 1996; Bates and Becher, 2017), these 
interdependent implications should be clearest when we condition a CEO-turnover effect of 
frustrating action on whether or not a hostile bid fails (in the absence of another offer for at 
least 1 year). We address these considerations in this section. 
We present and discuss results (average marginal effects induced by a one-unit change 
in each of the variables) from standard probit regressions, for the likelihood of CEO turnover 
after a hostile bid, in Section 6.1; and from an instrumental variable (IV) probit regression in 
Section 6.2, wherein the variable of main interest, for whether or not a hostile bid faces at least 
one type of frustrating action, is subsequently treated as a potentially suspect endogenous 
variable. For all regressions, we include the full set of bid and target-firm characteristics 
(including the variables for multiple bidders and a failed bid), as well as always controlling for 
then primary industries of target firms. The results from standard regressions are, in the main, 
not affected by whether or not we also control for announcement years of hostile bids. 
6.1 Standard likelihood model 
 We present results from standard probit regressions for the likelihood of CEO turnover 
after a hostile bid in Table 10. CEO age, CEO stockholding, and directors’ aggregate 
stockholding all have linear, curvilinear, and nonlinear (natural logarithmic) structural 
specifications in Columns (1) to (3), respectively. The regressions in Columns (4) and (5), upon 
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which we base the discussion, combine the strongest of these structural specifications for each 
of these variables. 
 For the variable of main interest, the result in Column (4) shows that for a CEO who 
retaliates with frustrating action, the probability of being replaced after a hostile bid is 27.31 
percentage-points higher than compared to a CEO who only resorts to less severe types of 
managerial resistance. This positive CEO-turnover effect of frustrating action is statistically 
significant (at the 1 percent level) and, relative to the overall turnover rate after hostile bids, 
materially substantial. It suggests misuse of frustrating action for entrenchment that reveals 
adverse information about offending managers strong enough to lead to an abnormally high 
likelihood of them being replaced after a hostile bid. For this to occur, it also suggests that, in 
the main, internal and external disciplinary mechanisms are sufficiently effective after a hostile 
bid. Empirical studies by Klein and Rosenfeld (1988) and Denis (1990) also find a high 
managerial-turnover rate after frustrating action. However, in both of these studies it only 
applies to the individual type of frustrating action being examined, and in neither of these 
studies is the turnover rate benchmarked against only less severe types of managerial resistance. 
The positive CEO-turnover effect of frustrating action is after we account for significant effects 
of the other variables. In particular, the negative effects of whether or not a hostile bid fails and 
firm size, and the positive effects of leverage and board size. However, whether or not a hostile 
bid has multiple bidders makes no significant difference for the likelihood of CEO turnover 
afterwards. 
 In Column (5), we interact the variable of main interest with the variable for a failed 
bid. The results show that for a CEO who retaliates with frustrating action, the probability of 
being replaced within 1 year of a failed bid (straight after a completed bid) is 38.13 (19.67) 
percentage-points higher than compared to a CEO who only resorts to less severe types of 
managerial resistance. These positive CEO-turnover effects of frustrating action are 
statistically significant (to at least the 5 percent level) and, relative to the overall turnover rate 
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after hostile bids, materially substantial. The first provides support for theoretical findings by 
Hirshleifer and Thakor (1994) suggesting that even after failed bids, adverse information 
revealed about managers during takeover bids (in our study, through misuse of frustrating 
action for entrenchment) can lead to an abnormally high turnover rate. Empirical findings by 
Denis and Serrano (1996) suggest that internal and external disciplinary mechanisms are 
sufficiently effective after failed bids for this to occur. However, they only find evidence 
suggesting that it is in response to adverse information already known about managers. We 
account for this prior information with the proxies for the extent of managerial quality before 
bid rumors, the effects of which, in the main, are not significant in this respect. 
 This then raises the question of why would managers misuse frustrating action for 
entrenchment when, in the main, it reveals adverse information about themselves and does not 
improve their chances of holding onto office after a hostile bid. The answer may partially lie 
with our other main finding from the results in Column (5). That is, conditional on managers 
retaliating with frustrating action, the probability of CEO turnover is 28.84 percentage-points 
lower after a failed bid than compared to after a completed bid. This CEO-turnover effect is 
also statistically significant (at the 1 percent level) and, relative to the overall turnover rate after 
hostile bids, materially substantial. It may also lie with a univariate result (not tabulated), in 
which we find that a hostile bid facing frustrating action is 17.01 percentage points more likely 
to fail than compared to a hostile bid only facing less severe types of managerial resistance. 
This result is statistically significant (at the 5 percent level) and, relative to the overall failure 
rate for hostile bids, materially substantial. All of this may increase the determination that 
managers with a predisposition for entrenchment are likely to have for wanting to make a 
hostile bid fail by resorting to a more severe form of resistance. 
6.2 IV likelihood model 
By not treating the variable of main interest as endogenous, there is the possibility that 
reverse causation is upwardly biasing (overstating) the positive CEO-turnover effect of 
30 
 
frustrating action. That is, in anticipation of an otherwise abnormally high likelihood of being 
turned over after a hostile bid, frustrating action may be managers’ preferable strategy for 
improving their chances of holding onto office because it is more severe than compared to only 
other types of resistance. Indeed, for a standard likelihood model, Harford (2003) finds that 
managers are more likely to show general hostility to a takeover bid the more they anticipate 
being turned over afterwards. 
 To address this concern, we present results from an IV probit regression for the 
likelihood of CEO turnover after a hostile bid in Table 11, by otherwise replicating the standard 
regression in Column (4) of Table 10. We intermediately estimate probabilities of frustrating 
action from the probit regression in Column (1) of Table 11, which includes all the other 
variables, and controls, in the standard regression. Also similar to when earlier addressing 
endogeneity, we exploit the Cadbury reforms of internal corporate-governance practice as a 
naturally exogenous source of variation, with theoretical validity, for estimating the 
probabilities of frustrating action. Again, this has strong empirical validity.  
The results from this intermediate regression also show that a hostile bid facing 
frustrating action is 34.43 percentage points less likely to have multiple bidders than compared 
to a hostile bid only facing less severe types of managerial resistance. This result is statistically 
significant (at the 1 percent level) and, relative to the overall rate for multiple bidders during 
hostile bids, materially substantial. Should multiple bidders be indicative of solicitation for the 
highest possible takeover premium, as is suggested from empirical findings for general hostility 
by Jennings and Mazzeo (1993), then the result is further suggestive of frustrating action likely 
being managers’ preferable resistance strategy for reasons other than of maximizing 
stockholder wealth. Furthermore, the result for whether or not a hostile bid fails is not 
significant. Therefore, other factors would seem to conspire against the determination that 
managers with a predisposition for entrenchment are likely to have for wanting to make a 
hostile bid fail by resorting to a more severe form of resistance. 
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We then use the estimated probabilities of frustrating action as an instrumental variable 
in the IV regression in Column (2) of Table 11.10 The result for a now-instrumented variable 
of main interest also shows a CEO-turnover effect of frustrating action that is positive and 
significant. Moreover, a Chi2 test of endogeneity is not significant. Most importantly, we are 
able to conclude that the positive CEO-turnover effect of frustrating action is almost certainly 
a causal effect in the standard regression, but not in a reverse sense. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This study is the first to examine hostile bids by differentiating between resistance 
strategies that do, and do not, include frustrating actions, i.e., potentially lethal operational 
actions and financial transactions intended to make it likely that the bid fails. Frustrating actions 
can include: (a) divestments in which assets of value to the bidder are sought to be sold or spun-
off; (b) acquisitions in which the intent is to make the resisted bid problematic from a size, 
strategic, or antitrust perspective through a merger, takeover, or joint venture; (c) a “pacman” 
counter-offer to takeover the bidder; (d) large payouts and share buybacks; (e) golden 
parachutes; and (f) ‘white squire’ private equity. During our 15-year sample period, 41 percent 
of hostile bids involved at least one type of frustrating action. The remaining hostile bids used 
resistance strategies that could be quite severe but were still non-lethal, e.g.: (a) releasing 
financial and strategic information to aid in justifying and communicating a higher valuation; 
(b) lobbying relevant stakeholders; (c) soliciting alternative friendly offers; (d) raising antitrust 
concerns; and (e) undertaking relevant litigation.  
Market-adjusted returns confined to the days when a frustrating action is actually 
announced provide support for findings from extant theoretical and empirical studies 
suggesting that stockholders expect it to make their firm significantly less valuable, or more 
difficult to acquire, for the initial bidder. However, contrary to theory, our new empirical 
                                                             
10 These results are not affected by whether we use maximum likelihood or a two-step estimator. 
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findings are suggestive of a frustrating action or the threat of such, likely being managers’ 
preferred strategy for managerial entrenchment reasons rather than wanting to optimally extract 
the maximum possible takeover premium for stockholders. 
First, we find that the average market-adjusted return confined to the days when a 
frustrating action is actually announced, significantly understates its wealth-reducing effect for 
stockholders, when benchmarked against the abnormal market-adjusted returns measured 
throughout the duration of a hostile bid and one year beyond for a failed bid (in the absence of 
another offer), and when benchmarked against non-lethal managerial resistance. However, we 
find no evidence to suggest that stockholders foresee the coming of frustrating action from as 
early as bid rumors to right up to the bid announcement. Secondly, relative to non-lethal 
managerial resistance, we find that a frustrating action is associated to a significantly lesser 
extent with common proxies for greater target-firm undervaluation and greater solicitation of 
another offer, and, by implication, with greater potential for price improvement. In contrast, 
we find that a frustrating action is associated to a significantly greater extent with common 
proxies for lower managerial quality and greater managerial control. 
Collectively, these findings support a stockholder conviction that a frustrating action 
was managers’ preferred resistance strategy for reasons of misuse for entrenchment. That said, 
we also find an increased CEO-turnover effect of a frustrating action, suggesting that its misuse 
reveals adverse information about offending managers significant enough to lead to an 
abnormally high likelihood (relative to non-lethal managerial resistance) of them being 
replaced after a hostile bid, and particularly within 1 year of a failed bid. For this to occur, it 
also suggests that internal and external disciplinary mechanisms are sufficiently effective after 
a hostile bid, and particularly so after a failed bid. 
The findings are after we account for effects of salient bid and target-firm 
characteristics, and, where applicable, for unobservable factors that increase the likelihood of 
observing managerial resistance during a takeover bid. Moreover, we exploit the Cadbury 
33 
 
reforms of UK internal corporate-governance practice during 1993 as a naturally exogenous 
source of variation (with strong theoretical and empirical validity) for estimating probabilities 
of frustrating action for use as an instrumental variable. Importantly, we are able to conclude 
that the negative stockholder-wealth effect and positive CEO-turnover effect of frustrating 
action are likely causal effects. 
There has been vigorous debate in the finance industry about the severity of managerial 
resistance.11  Our study also indicates that the important dilemma surrounding means and 
motives, good and bad, for bid resistance should be addressed, not just by considering managers’ 
decision to resist per se, but also the manner in which they then decide to retaliate: a frustrating 
action intended to torpedo the bid, or non-lethal managerial resistance.  
                                                             
11 See: Hostile takeovers rise to 14-year high in M&A as confidence grows, Financial Times, June 8, 2014; 





Definitions for bid and target-firm characteristics   
This table provides definitions for bid and target-firm characteristics. The data and information sources used 
to construct these variables are as follows. Panel A: bid characteristics (dependent variables) – the 
Datastream database and Regulatory News Service (RNS) of the London Stock Exchange. Panel B: bid 
characteristics (independent variables) – the RNS and Datastream database. Panel C: target-firm 
characteristics (independent variables related to information asymmetry) – the Corporate Register and 
Datastream database. Panel D: target-firm characteristics (independent variables that proxy for the extent of 
managerial quality) – the Datastream database. Panel E: target-firm characteristics (independent variables 
that proxy for the extent of managerial control) – Companies House, the Corporate Register, and the RNS. 
The sample of hostile bids is described in Table 1. 
Panel A: bid characteristics (dependent variables) 
Bid characteristic Definition 
Expected abnormal 
stockholder wealth 
Market-adjusted return (benchmarked against the FTSE All Share) from 
before bid rumors through to bid announcement. 
Actual abnormal stockholder 
wealth 
Market-adjusted return (benchmarked against the FTSE All Share) 
throughout the duration a hostile bid and 1 year beyond for a failed bid 
(in the absence of another offer). 
CEO turnover Binary variable for whether or not the CEO is replaced straight after a 
completed bid and within 1 year of a failed bid (in the absence of another 
offer).            
Panel B: bid characteristics (independent variables) 
Bid characteristic Definition 
Multiple bidders Binary variable for whether or not a hostile bid has multiple bidders.    
Failed bid Binary variable for whether or not a hostile bid fails.   
Initial premium Initial-offer price divided by stock price before bid rumors minus one.      
Cash-only initial offer Binary variable for whether or not the initial offer is of cash-only.   
Panel C: target-firm characteristics (independent variables related to information asymmetry)  
Target-firm characteristic Definition 
Recently exchange-listed Binary variable for whether or not the target firm was only recently 
exchange-listed (as flagged by the Corporate Register).    
Stock volatility Standard deviation of daily market-adjusted returns (benchmarked 
against the FTSE All Share) for the fiscal period before bid rumors.   
Cash-to-assets ratio Cash divided by assets for the fiscal period before bid rumors.    
Firm size Market capitalization plus debt for the fiscal period before bid rumors. 
In real (2003) GBP million. 
Leverage Debt divided by assets for the fiscal period before bid rumors.  
Panel D: target-firm characteristics (independent variables that proxy for the extent of managerial 
quality) 
Target-firm characteristic Definition 
Asset-turnover ratio Sales divided by assets for the fiscal period before bid rumors.         
Stock performance Market-adjusted return (benchmarked against the FTSE All Share) for 
the fiscal period before bid rumors. 
Market-to-book ratio Market capitalization plus debt divided by assets for the fiscal period 
before bid rumors.   
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Table A1 (continued) 
Definitions for bid and target-firm characteristics 
Panel E: target-firm characteristics (independent variables that proxy for the extent of managerial 
control) 
Target-firm characteristic Definition 
CEO age CEO age before bid rumors.             




Directors’ aggregate stockholding (as a percentage of the outstanding 
stock) before bid rumors.   
Outside and reputable board 
chair 
Binary variable for whether or not the board is chaired by an outside 
(independent) and reputable (derived from holding at least one other 
directorship of an exchange-listed firm) director before bid rumors.   
Board size Number of directors before bid rumors. 
Split board  Binary variable for whether or not the board is split over whether or not 
to publicly reject (resist) the initial offer. 
Aggregate outside 
blockholdings 
Aggregate outside blockholdings (each of at least 5 percent of the 
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Sample of hostile bids: hostile bids 
This table presents time-series data for hostile bids. The sample of hostile bids is constructed by beginning with takeover 
offers for more than 50 percent control of UK target firms included in the Securities Data Corporation database as announced 
between July 1, 1989 and December 31, 2003. The Corporate Register (published first in March 1989 and thereafter at least 
twice a year) is then used to exclude takeover offers for target firms not listed on the London Stock Exchange, and primarily 
from more-regulated industries: financials, utilities, telecommunications, broadcasting, newspapers, and public transport. In 
the absence of a previous offer for at least 1 year, a takeover bid in the sample begins from as early as rumors, before 
proceeding to announcement of the initial offer. A takeover bid then extends to other offers, each successively separated by 
no more than 1 year, until completed or reported as having failed. These screening and merging procedures are carried out 
using the Regulatory News Service (RNS) of the London Stock Exchange. A takeover bid is hostile in the sample when the 
RNS reports that managers publicly reject (resist) the initial offer. The time-series data in Panel A shows the annual 
percentages of takeover bids that are hostile. The time-series data in Panel B shows the annual percentages of real (2003) 
GBP million of target-firm value attributable to hostile bids. 
Panel A: annual percentages of takeover bids that are hostile  
Announcement year Takeover bids Hostile bids Percentage hostile 
1989 42 13 30.95 
1990 55 15 27.27 
1991 58 17 29.31 
1992 32 11 34.38 
1993 27 5 18.52 
1994 33 5 15.15 
1995 41 8 19.51 
1996 39 8 20.51 
1997 73 7 9.59 
1998 85 8 9.41 
1999 119 12 10.08 
2000 82 7 8.54 
2001 34 5 14.71 
2002 34 6 17.65 
2003 38 3 7.89 
1989-2003 792 130 16.41 
Panel B: annual percentages of real (2003) GBP million of target-firm value attributable to hostile bids 
Announcement year Takeover bids Hostile bids Percentage hostile Observations 
1989 32,351.37 28,525.87 88.18 37 
1990 17,857.70 5,260.42 29.46 53 
1991 26,487.37 16,112.39 60.83 56 
1992 5,449.71 4,001.31 73.42 32 
1993 2,661.87 775.74 29.14 22 
1994 8,625.51 5,733.94 66.48 30 
1995 25,192.68 19,030.70 75.54 38 
1996 11,291.71 3,523.25 31.20 34 
1997 17,802.34 8,560.41 48.09 69 
1998 42,226.63 4,085.01 9.67 78 
1999 52,204.45 5,234.05 10.03 115 
2000 106,577.50 6,332.86 5.94 79 
2001 8,899.71 5,575.99 62.65 33 
2002 15,028.02 634.29 4.22 31 
2003 20,055.11 10,938.58 54.54 35 




Sample of hostile bids: descriptive statistics for bid and target-firm characteristics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for bid and target-firm characteristics. Definitions for these variables are provided in 
Table A1 of the Appendix. The sample of hostile bids is described in Table 1. 
Bid or target-firm characteristic Mean Standard deviation Observations 
Expected abnormal stockholder wealth 0.2348 0.2569 119 
Actual abnormal stockholder wealth 0.2447 0.4700 120 
CEO turnover 0.4463  121 
Multiple bidders 0.1923  130 
Failed bid 0.3154  130 
Initial premium 0.3349 0.3728 128 
Cash-only initial offer 0.6769  130 
Recently exchange-listed 0.1628  129 
Stock volatility 0.0220 0.0137 128 
Cash-to-assets ratio 0.1054 0.1527 127 
Firm size 986.70 2,336.59 126 
Leverage 0.5544 0.1822 127 
Asset-turnover ratio 1.3861    0.8920  127 
Stock performance -0.3247 0.4208 128 
Market-to-book ratio 1.3185 0.5003 126 
CEO age 51.57 5.59 120 
CEO stockholding 2.72  7.26 121 
Directors’ aggregate  stockholding 2.21 6.51 121 
Outside and reputable board chair 0.3471  121 
Board size 7.13 2.35 121 
Split board 0.1231  130 




Sample of hostile bids: frustrating action 
This table presents summary data for frustrating action. The sample of hostile bids is described in Table 1. The Regulatory 
News Service of the London Stock Exchange is used to differentiate between frustrating action and only less severe types of 
managerial resistance during hostile bids. Unlike frustrating action, less severe types of managerial resistance do not extend 
to intentions to retaliate with obstructive operational actions and financial transactions. Rather, less severe types of managerial 
resistance amount, in the main, to releasing financial and strategic information, lobbying stakeholders, raising antitrust 
concerns, litigation, and solicitation of another offer (including from a white knight). Divestment type of frustrating action is 
spinning-off and selling-off crown-jewel assets. Acquisition type of frustrating action is making a pacman offer for the initial 
bidder, taking-over another firm or purchasing its assets, and creating a joint venture. Payout type of frustrating action is 
repurchasing stock and paying a special dividend. White squire is a blocking stake (as distinct from solicitation of a white-
knight offer). 
Frustrating action Hostile bids % of all hostile bids Observations 
At least one type 53 40.77 130 
Divestment 26 20.00 130 
Acquisition 17 13.08 130 
Payout 8 6.15 130 
Golden parachute 5 3.85 130 
Management buyout 5 3.85 130 




Effect of frustrating action on abnormal stockholder wealth from a hostile bid: expected stockholder-wealth effect 
This table presents results (coefficients induced by a one-unit change in each of the variables) from standard linear regressions 
for expected abnormal stockholder wealth from a hostile bid. The sample of hostile bids is described in Tables 1 and 2. 
Definitions for initial-offer and target-firm characteristics are provided in Table A1 of the Appendix. Frustrating action is 
described in Table 3. Frustrating action is a binary variable for whether or not a hostile bid faces at least one type of frustrating 
action. Controls for then primary industries of target firms are combined into four groups: oil & gas and basic materials; 
industrials, including technology hardware & equipment; consumer goods and healthcare; and consumer services, including 
software & computers services. CEO age, CEO stockholding, and directors’ aggregate stockholding all have linear, 
curvilinear, and nonlinear (natural logarithmic) structural specifications in Columns (1) to (3), respectively. The regression in 
Column (4) combines the strongest of these structural specifications for each of these variables. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Initial-offer or target-firm 
characteristic 
Expected abnormal stockholder wealth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Frustrating action -0.0316 -0.0303 -0.0352 -0.0299 
 (0.0289) (0.0315) (0.0303) (0.0304) 
Initial premium 0.5397*** 0.5429*** 0.5436*** 0.5424*** 
 (0.0560) (0.0588) (0.0574) (0.0562) 
Cash-only initial offer 0.1036*** 0.1168*** 0.1057*** 0.1170*** 
 (0.0390) (0.0399) (0.0386) (0.0399) 
Recently exchange-listed 0.0265 0.0340 0.0233 0.0345 
 (0.0445) (0.0430) (0.0434) (0.0432) 
Stock volatility 1.5585 2.2132 1.9625 2.2056 
 (1.7809) (1.7678) (1.7141) (1.7562) 
Cash-to-assets ratio 0.0145 0.0487 0.0296 0.0438 
 (0.0935) (0.1055) (0.0918) (0.0922) 
ln(Firm size) 0.0334*** 0.0291** 0.0271** 0.0288** 
 (0.0118) (0.0126) (0.0128) (0.0124) 
Leverage -0.0610 -0.0813 -0.0652 -0.0799 
 (0.0936) (0.0985) (0.0932) (0.0935) 
Asset-turnover ratio 0.0145 0.0158 0.0116 0.0158 
 (0.0205) (0.0216) (0.0215) (0.0214) 
Stock performance 0.0459 0.0666 0.0595 0.0665 
 (0.0450) (0.0474) (0.0471) (0.0466) 
Market-to-book ratio 0.0125 0.0054 0.0126 0.0060 
 (0.0304) (0.0290) (0.0294) (0.0277) 
CEO age 0.0008 -0.0679**  -0.0677** 
 (0.0026) (0.0306)  (0.0301) 
CEO age2  0.0007**  0.0007** 
  (0.0003)  (0.0003) 
ln(CEO age)   0.0136  
   (0.1308)  
CEO stockholding 0.0021 0.0031  0.0020 
 (0.0021) (0.0111)  (0.0022) 
CEO stockholding2  -0.0000   
  (0.0004)   
ln(1 + CEO stockholding)   0.0091  
   (0.0158)  
Directors’ aggregate stockholding 0.0005 -0.0084  -0.0082 
 (0.0016) (0.0094)  (0.0085) 
Directors’ aggregate stockholding2  0.0001  0.0001 
  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
ln(1 + Directors’ aggregate 
stockholding)   -0.0203  
   (0.0236)  
Outside and reputable board chair -0.0169 -0.0196 -0.0202 -0.0196 
 (0.0286) (0.0277) (0.0283) (0.0274) 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Effect of frustrating action on abnormal stockholder wealth from a hostile bid: expected stockholder-wealth effect 
Initial-offer or target-firm 
characteristic 
Expected abnormal stockholder wealth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Board size 0.0008 0.0004 0.0010 0.0006 
 (0.0072) (0.0074) (0.0071) (0.0071) 
Split board -0.0950 -0.0981 -0.0919 -0.0979 
 (0.0595) (0.0618) (0.0564) (0.0618) 
Aggregate outside blockholdings -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0004 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Constant -0.6604** 1.1931 -0.5305 1.1889 
 (0.2901) (0.8428) (0.6118) (0.8309) 
Controls for then primary 
industries of target firms Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for announcement years 
of hostile bids Yes Yes Yes No 
F-statistic  13.60*** 51.02*** 13.34*** 46.41*** 
R2-statistic 79.46 80.59 79.56 80.58 




Effect of frustrating action on abnormal stockholder wealth from a hostile bid: actual stockholder-wealth effect 
This table presents results (coefficients induced by a one-unit change in each of the variables) from standard linear regressions 
for actual abnormal stockholder wealth from a hostile bid. The sample of hostile bids is described in Tables 1 and 2. 
Definitions for bid and target-firm characteristics are provided in Table A1 of the Appendix. Frustrating action is described 
in Table 3. Frustrating action is a binary variable for whether or not a hostile bid faces at least one type of frustrating action. 
Controls for then primary industries of target firms are combined into four groups: oil & gas and basic materials; industrials, 
including technology hardware & equipment; consumer goods and healthcare; and consumer services, including software & 
computers services. CEO age, CEO stockholding, and directors’ aggregate stockholding all have linear, curvilinear, and 
nonlinear (natural logarithmic) structural specifications in Columns (1) to (3), respectively. The regression in Column (4) 
combines the strongest of these structural specifications for each of these variables. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.     
Bid or target-firm characteristic 
Actual abnormal stockholder wealth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Frustrating action -0.1972** -0.1881** -0.2032** -0.1913** 
 (0.0824) (0.0768) (0.0826) (0.0768) 
Multiple bidders 0.1099 0.0739 0.1035 0.0727 
 (0.0980) (0.0956) (0.0984) (0.0932) 
Failed bid -0.0436 -0.0414 -0.0584 -0.0520 
 (0.0961) (0.0930) (0.0945) (0.0877) 
Initial premium 0.6192*** 0.6189*** 0.6286*** 0.6218*** 
 (0.0951) (0.0977) (0.1003) (0.0977) 
Cash-only initial offer 0.3705*** 0.4183*** 0.3735*** 0.4109*** 
 (0.0889) (0.0876) (0.0866) (0.0859) 
Recently exchange-listed -0.1172 -0.0799 -0.1318 -0.0939 
 (0.1029) (0.1091) (0.1003) (0.1079) 
Stock volatility 6.3566 8.0835* 7.6095 8.2989* 
 (4.5686) (4.5726) (4.6714) (4.6114) 
Cash-to-assets ratio -0.0942 -0.0920 -0.0141 -0.0027 
 (0.2498) (0.2765) (0.2512) (0.2487) 
ln(Firm size) 0.0983*** 0.0797** 0.0828*** 0.0841*** 
 (0.0288) (0.0308) (0.0288) (0.0300) 
Leverage -0.3478 -0.3696 -0.3788* -0.4099* 
 (0.2280) (0.2278) (0.2222) (0.2412) 
Asset-turnover ratio 0.1075* 0.1141* 0.0988* 0.1123* 
 (0.0573) (0.0583) (0.0568) (0.0589) 
Stock performance 0.1632 0.2117* 0.2087* 0.2162* 
 (0.1181) (0.1256) (0.1213) (0.1262) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.0867 -0.0898 -0.0820 -0.0927 
 (0.0708) (0.0705) (0.0729) (0.0711) 
CEO age -0.0033 -0.2188**  -0.2217** 
 (0.0068) (0.0874)  (0.0862) 
CEO age2  0.0021**  0.0021** 
  (0.0008)  (0.0008) 
ln(CEO age)   -0.2860  
   (0.3540)  
CEO stockholding 0.0127** -0.0097  0.0141** 
 (0.0061) (0.0341)  (0.0055) 
CEO stockholding2  0.0010   
  (0.0013)   
ln(1 + CEO stockholding)   0.0797  
   (0.0535)  
Directors’ aggregate stockholding -0.0004 -0.0215  -0.0236 
 (0.0039) (0.0160)  (0.0163) 
Directors’ aggregate stockholding2  0.0003  0.0004 
  (0.0003)  (0.0003) 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Effect of frustrating action on abnormal stockholder wealth from a hostile bid: actual stockholder-wealth effect 
Bid or target-firm characteristic 
Actual abnormal stockholder wealth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln(1 + Directors’ aggregate 
stockholding)   -0.0671  
   (0.0507)  
Outside and reputable board chair 0.0125 -0.0011 0.0083 0.0029 
 (0.0791) (0.0791) (0.0790) (0.0798) 
Board size 0.0016 0.0032 0.0007 0.0003 
 (0.0176) (0.0165) (0.0170) (0.0164) 
Split board -0.1057 -0.1103 -0.1060 -0.1133 
 (0.0999) (0.1085) (0.1008) (0.1089) 
Aggregate outside blockholdings -0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0010 
 (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
Constant -1.8887*** 3.9357* -0.5394 4.0025* 
 (0.6932) (2.2978) (1.4671) (2.2699) 
Controls for then primary 
industries of target firms Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for announcement years 
of hostile bids Yes Yes Yes No 
F-statistic  6.00*** 25.68*** 5.54*** 25.11*** 
R2-statistic 62.43 65.94 62.75 65.63 




Effect of frustrating action on abnormal stockholder wealth from a hostile bid: endogeneity 
This table presents results (coefficients induced by a one-unit change in each of the variables) from an instrumental variable 
(IV) linear regression for actual abnormal stockholder wealth from a hostile bid, wherein frustrating action is treated as a 
potentially suspect endogenous variable, and by otherwise replicating the standard regression in Column (4) of Table 5. Since 
frustrating action is a binary variable, probabilities of frustrating action are intermediately estimated from a probit regression 
for the likelihood that it is managers’ preferable resistance strategy. This intermediate regression (results from which are 
average marginal effects induced by a one-unit change in each of the variables) in Column (1) of this table includes all the 
other variables, and controls, in the standard regression. In addition, the post-Cadbury variable is exploited as a naturally 
exogenous source of variation for estimating the probabilities of frustrating action. Post-Cadbury is a binary variable for 
whether or not it is mandatory for the target firm to comply with the Cadbury reforms of internal corporate-governance 
practice before bid rumors. The estimated probabilities of frustrating action are then used as an instrumental variable in the 
IV regression in Column (2) of this table. Because of the intermediate regression, the first-stage of the IV regression is not 
tabulated. Two-stage least squares is used to generate the results. The same approach is applied to expected abnormal 
stockholder wealth from a hostile bid in Columns (3) and (4) of this table, by otherwise replicating the standard regression in 
Column (4) of Table 4. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level, respectively.     
Bid or target-firm 
characteristic 
Actual stockholder-wealth effect Expected stockholder-wealth effect 
Frustrating action 
Actual abnormal 
stockholder wealth Frustrating action 
Expected abnormal 
stockholder wealth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Frustrating action (now-
instrumented)  -0.3654***  -0.0025 
  (0.1105)  (0.0536) 
Multiple bidders -0.3370*** 0.0318   
 (0.0412) (0.0785)   
Failed bid -0.0553 -0.0493   
 (0.0687) (0.0731)   
Initial premium 0.5667*** 0.6616*** 0.4471*** 0.5360*** 
 (0.1297) (0.0882) (0.0973) (0.0498) 
Cash-only initial offer -0.2093*** 0.3969*** -0.1629** 0.1200*** 
 (0.0609) (0.0702) (0.0668) (0.0330) 
Recently exchange-listed -0.4403*** -0.1668* -0.4485*** 0.0460 
 (0.0245) (0.0962) (0.0282) (0.0381) 
Stock volatility -8.5628* 7.3265* -7.5263* 2.3698 
 (4.3973) (4.1632) (4.0243) (1.5129) 
Cash-to-assets ratio -0.9117*** 0.0148 -0.6937** 0.0406 
 (0.3342) (0.2024) (0.3244) (0.0746) 
ln(Firm size) 0.0150 0.0850*** -0.0017 0.0286*** 
 (0.0295) (0.0274) (0.0317) (0.0103) 
Leverage 0.3758* -0.3817** 0.2447 -0.0845 
 (0.1964) (0.1888) (0.2416) (0.0774) 
Asset-turnover ratio -0.2409*** 0.0920* -0.2220*** 0.0191 
 (0.0613) (0.0481) (0.0475) (0.0200) 
Stock performance -0.0513 0.1991* 0.0264 0.0677* 
 (0.0914) (0.1050) (0.0956) (0.0388) 
Market-to-book ratio 0.0459 -0.1065* 0.0112 0.0102 
 (0.0888) (0.0599) (0.1022) (0.0250) 
CEO age 0.2018*** -0.1993*** 0.2119*** -0.0719*** 
 (0.0587) (0.0735) (0.0748) (0.0254) 
CEO age2 -0.0018*** 0.0019*** -0.0020*** 0.0007*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0002) 
CEO stockholding 0.0460*** 0.0179*** 0.0395*** 0.0015 
 (0.0095) (0.0045) (0.0081) (0.0021) 
Directors’ aggregate 
stockholding -0.0884*** -0.0307** -0.0658 -0.0069 
 (0.0323) (0.0152) (0.0413) (0.0081) 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Effect of frustrating action on abnormal stockholder wealth from a hostile bid: endogeneity 
Bid or target-firm 
characteristic 
Actual stockholder-wealth effect Expected stockholder-wealth effect 
Frustrating action 
Actual abnormal 
stockholder wealth Frustrating action 
Expected abnormal 
stockholder wealth 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Directors’ aggregate 
stockholding2 0.0009 0.0005** -0.0007 0.0001 
 (0.0033) (0.0002) (0.0039) (0.0001) 
Outside and reputable board 
chair -0.2601*** -0.0262 -0.1642** -0.0152 
 (0.0530) (0.0683) (0.0729) (0.0236) 
Board size -0.0873*** -0.0040 -0.0502** 0.0011 
 (0.0286) (0.0150) (0.0219) (0.0059) 
Split board -0.3308*** -0.1600* -0.3213*** -0.0906* 
 (0.0569) (0.0901) (0.0718) (0.0536) 
Aggregate outside 
blockholdings -0.0126*** -0.0016 -0.0112*** -0.0003 
 (0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0010) 
Post-Cadbury 0.5278***  0.5539***  
 (0.0343)  (0.0343)  
Constant 0.4415*** 3.5193* 0.4430*** 1.2831* 
 (0.0236) (1.9450) (0.0263) (0.6800) 
Controls for then primary 
industries of target firms Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Chi2 statistic 585.89*** 1275.45*** 598.69*** 2195.98*** 
Pseudo R2-statistic 62.41  54.37  
R2-statistic  63.78  80.43 
F-statistic from a first-stage test 
of instrument validity  76.41***  46.74*** 
Chi2 test of endogeneity  4.82**  0.46 




Potential determinants of the likelihood that frustrating action is managers’ preferable resistance strategy: standard 
likelihood model 
This table presents results (average marginal effects induced by a one-unit change in each of the variables) from standard 
probit regressions for the likelihood that frustrating action is managers’ preferable resistance strategy. The sample of hostile 
bids is described in Tables 1 and 2. Definitions for initial-offer and target-firm characteristics are provided in Table A1 of the 
Appendix. Frustrating action is described in Table 3. Frustrating action is a binary variable for whether or not a hostile bid 
faces at least one type of frustrating action. Post-Cadbury is a binary variable for whether or not it is mandatory for the target 
firm to comply with the Cadbury reforms of internal corporate-governance practice before bid rumors. Controls for then 
primary industries of target firms are combined into four groups: oil & gas and basic materials; industrials, including 
technology hardware & equipment; consumer goods and healthcare; and consumer services, including software & computers 
services. Because of the addition of the post-Cadbury variable, there are no controls for announcement years of hostile bids. 
CEO age, CEO stockholding, and directors’ aggregate stockholding all have linear, curvilinear, and nonlinear (natural 
logarithmic) structural specifications in Columns (1) to (3), respectively. The regression in Column (4) combines the strongest 
of these structural specifications for each of these variables. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes 
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Initial-offer or target-firm 
characteristic 
Frustrating action 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Initial premium 0.4305*** 0.4589*** 0.3686*** 0.4447*** 
 (0.1048) (0.1027) (0.0941) (0.0971) 
Cash-only initial offer -0.1269* -0.1589** -0.1462** -0.1646** 
 (0.0736) (0.0656) (0.0738) (0.0674) 
Recently exchange-listed -0.4488*** -0.4501*** -0.4529*** -0.4484*** 
 (0.0311) (0.0278) (0.0325) (0.0281) 
Stock volatility -7.3131 -7.1442* -6.2481 -7.7159* 
 (4.5677) (4.0427) (4.3126) (4.0747) 
Cash-to-assets ratio -0.5445* -0.6522* -0.2479 -0.6825** 
 (0.3219) (0.3338) (0.2930) (0.3274) 
ln(Firm size) -0.0073 -0.0007 -0.0075 -0.0026 
 (0.0334) (0.0318) (0.0346) (0.0319) 
Leverage 0.0758 0.1875 0.0968 0.2615 
 (0.2473) (0.2446) (0.2432) (0.2269) 
Asset-turnover ratio -0.1983*** -0.2223*** -0.1845*** -0.2234*** 
 (0.0529) (0.0468) (0.0456) (0.0477) 
Stock performance -0.0362 0.0385 0.0089 0.0274 
 (0.1105) (0.0992) (0.1090) (0.0951) 
Market-to-book ratio 0.0416 0.0139 0.0010 0.0095 
 (0.1102) (0.1037) (0.1105) (0.1020) 
CEO age 0.0085 0.2052***  0.2127*** 
 (0.0066) (0.0727)  (0.0736) 
CEO age2  -0.0019***  -0.0020*** 
  (0.0007)  (0.0007) 
ln(CEO age)   0.3029  
   (0.3266)  
CEO stockholding 0.0362*** 0.0584**  0.0387*** 
 (0.0074) (0.0282)  (0.0078) 
CEO stockholding2  -0.0008   
  (0.0010)   
ln(1 + CEO stockholding)   0.1954***  
   (0.0481)  







 (0.0198) (0.0521)  (0.0191) 
Directors’ aggregate 
stockholding2  0.0006   
  (0.0047)   
ln(1 + Directors’ aggregate 
stockholding)   -0.2342***  
   (0.0786)  
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Table 7 (continued) 
Potential determinants of the likelihood that frustrating action is managers’ preferable resistance strategy: standard 
likelihood model 
Initial-offer or target-firm 
characteristic 
Frustrating action 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Outside and reputable board chair -0.1369* -0.1552** -0.1263* -0.1665** 
 (0.0721) (0.0710) (0.0762) (0.0687) 
Board size -0.0445* -0.0519** -0.0399* -0.0506** 
 (0.0232) (0.0220) (0.0210) (0.0222) 
Split board -0.3033*** -0.3169*** -0.2691*** -0.3207*** 
 (0.0784) (0.0728) (0.0906) (0.0718) 
Aggregate outside blockholdings -0.0100*** -0.0113*** -0.0088*** -0.0111*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
Post-Cadbury 0.5698*** 0.5565*** 0.5874*** 0.5568*** 
 (0.0361) (0.0328) (0.0360) (0.0344) 
Constant 0.4401*** 0.4433*** 0.4406*** 0.4429*** 
 (0.0282) (0.0262) (0.0283) (0.0263) 
Controls for then primary 
industries of target firms Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Chi2 statistic 502.75*** 630.65*** 561.98*** 696.13*** 
Pseudo R2-statistic 51.50 54.57 49.13 54.36 




Potential determinants of the likelihood that frustrating action is managers’ preferable resistance strategy: standard 
likelihood model (CEO age) 
This table presents supplementary results (predictive margins and contrasts in predictive margins) from the standard 
regression in Column (4) of Table 7 detailing the inverted curvilinear relationship between the probability of frustrating action 
and CEO age. Panel A shows the probabilities of frustrating action induced by successive two-unit changes in CEO age. Panel 
B shows the changes in the probability of frustrating action induced by successive two-unit changes in CEO age. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Panel A: probabilities of frustrating action induced by 
successive two-unit changes in CEO age 
Panel B: changes in the probability of frustrating action 
induced by successive two-unit changes in CEO age 
CEO age Predictive margin Change in CEO age 
Contrast in predictive 
margins 
38 0.1129**   
 (0.0477)   
40 0.1686*** 38-40 0.0557*** 
 (0.0611)  (0.0160) 
42 0.2407*** 40-42 0.0721*** 
 (0.0632)  (0.0118) 
44 0.3185*** 42-44 0.0778*** 
 (0.0539)  (0.0179) 
46 0.3894*** 44-46 0.0709*** 
 (0.0421)  (0.0215) 
48 0.4458*** 46-48 0.0563*** 
 (0.0349)  (0.0189) 
50 0.4852*** 48-50 0.0395*** 
 (0.0325)  (0.0146) 
52 0.5083*** 50-52 0.0231* 
 (0.0322)  (0.0118) 
54 0.5161*** 52-54 0.0078 
 (0.0332)  (0.0117) 
56 0.5091*** 54-56 -0.0070 
 (0.0371)  (0.0143) 
58 0.4869*** 56-58 -0.0222 
 (0.0466)  (0.0188) 
60 0.4484*** 58-60 -0.0385 
 (0.0639)  (0.0247) 
62 0.3929*** 60-62 -0.0554* 
 (0.0879)  (0.0300) 
64 0.3227*** 62-64 -0.0703** 
 (0.1128)  (0.0300) 
66 0.2449* 64-66 -0.0777*** 




Potential determinants of the likelihood that frustrating action is managers’ preferable resistance strategy: likelihood 
model with sample selection 
This table presents results (average marginal effects induced by a one-unit change in each of the variables) from a probit 
regression with sample selection for the likelihood that frustrating action is managers’ preferable resistance strategy, wherein 
unobservable factors that increase the likelihood of observing resistance during a takeover bid are taken into account, and by 
otherwise replicating the standard regression in Column (4) of Table 7. Aggregate unobservable factors that when increased 
increase the likelihood that managers will show general hostility to a takeover bid are first estimated. General hostility is a 
binary variable for whether or not managers publicly reject (resist) the initial offer. This first-stage in Column (1) of this table 
includes all the variables (including post-Cadbury), and controls, in the standard regression, except for the split-board variable 
because whether or not the board is split over resisting is only observable when managers show general hostility to a takeover 
bid. However, for the first-stage only, the structural specification for the directors’ aggregate stockholding is changed to the 
curvilinear structural specification because this is the strongest structural specification for this variable in the context of all 
takeover bids (not only those that are hostile). In addition, for estimating the aggregate unobservable factors, two new 
variables, bid rumors and mandatory initial offer, are used that are plausibly related to the probability of general hostility, but 
not to the probability of frustrating action. Bid rumors is a binary variable for whether or not a takeover bid begins with 
rumors. Mandatory initial offer is a binary variable for whether or not the initial offer is mandatory because the bidder acquired 
a stake of, or raised its toehold to, at least 30 percent. A Chi2 test for including the estimated aggregate unobservable factors 
in the second-stage, for the probability of frustrating action, in Column (2) of Table 9 is then used. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Initial-offer or target-firm characteristic 
General hostility Frustrating action 
(1) (2) 
Initial premium -0.1439** 0.4441*** 
 (0.0658) (0.1069) 
Cash-only initial offer 0.1554*** -0.1624** 
 (0.0421) (0.0793) 
Recently exchange-listed -0.1145** -0.4362*** 
 (0.0582) (0.1521) 
Stock volatility -5.4447** -8.0032 
 (2.1350) (5.0851) 
Cash-to-assets ratio 0.1615 -0.6890** 
 (0.1608) (0.3219) 
ln(Firm size) 0.0831*** -0.0006 
 (0.0205) (0.0399) 
Leverage -0.3973*** 0.2563 
 (0.1191) (0.2346) 
Asset-turnover ratio 0.0362 -0.2264*** 
 (0.0282) (0.0518) 
Stock performance -0.2160*** 0.0208 
 (0.0498) (0.1320) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.0902* 0.0078 
 (0.0476) (0.1097) 
CEO age 0.1114*** 0.2174** 
 (0.0430) (0.0850) 
CEO age2 -0.0011*** -0.0020** 
 (0.0004) (0.0008) 
CEO stockholding -0.0017 0.0390*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0077) 
Directors’ aggregate stockholding -0.0124** -0.0733*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0219) 
Directors’ aggregate stockholding2 0.0001***  
 (0.0000)  
Outside and reputable board chair 0.0628 -0.1665** 
 (0.0472) (0.0696) 
Board size -0.0187 -0.0520* 
 (0.0114) (0.0279) 
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Table 9 (continued) 
Potential determinants of the likelihood that frustrating action is managers’ preferable resistance strategy: likelihood 
model with sample selection 
Initial-offer or target-firm characteristic 
General hostility Frustrating action 
(1) (2) 
Split board  -0.3153*** 
  (0.0953) 
Aggregate outside blockholdings 0.0008 -0.0112*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0026) 
Post-Cadbury -0.3613*** 0.5554*** 
 (0.0411) (0.0735) 
Bid rumors 0.2276***  
 (0.0471)  
Mandatory initial offer 0.1151  
 (0.0800)  
Constant 0.4634*** 0.4287** 
 (0.0253) (0.1794) 
Controls for then primary industries of target firms Yes Yes 
Chi2 statistic 1290.58*** 
Chi2 test for including the estimated aggregate 
unobservable factors in the second-stage 0.01 
Observations 668 




Effect of frustrating action on the likelihood of CEO turnover after a hostile bid: standard likelihood model 
This table presents results (average marginal effects induced by a one-unit change in each of the variables) from standard 
probit regressions for the likelihood of CEO turnover after a hostile bid. The sample of hostile bids is described in Tables 1 
and 2. Definitions for bid and target-firm characteristics are provided in Table A1 of the Appendix. Frustrating action is 
described in Table 3. Frustrating action is a binary variable for whether or not a hostile bid faces at least one type of frustrating 
action. Controls for then primary industries of target firms are combined into four groups: oil & gas and basic materials; 
industrials, including technology hardware & equipment; consumer goods and healthcare; and consumer services, including 
software & computers services. CEO age, CEO stockholding, and directors’ aggregate stockholding all have linear, 
curvilinear, and nonlinear (natural logarithmic) structural specifications in Columns (1) to (3), respectively. The regression in 
Columns (4) and (5) combine the strongest of these structural specifications for each of these variables. In Column (5), the 
variable for frustrating action is interacted with the variable for a failed bid. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Bid or target-firm 
characteristic 
CEO turnover 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Frustrating action 0.2721*** 0.2837*** 0.2870*** 0.2731*** 0.1967** 
 (0.0799) (0.0738) (0.0760) (0.0788) (0.0863) 
Frustrating action × Failed bid     0.3813*** 
     (0.0808) 
Multiple bidders -0.0903 -0.0985 -0.0801 -0.0766 -0.1014 
 (0.0991) (0.0987) (0.0954) (0.0969) (0.0895) 
Failed bid -0.4254*** -0.4155*** -0.4108*** -0.4118*** -0.5207*** 
 (0.0677) (0.0684) (0.0684) (0.0691) (0.0446) 
Initial premium 0.0527 0.0180 0.0175 0.0277 0.0155 
 (0.1042) (0.1062) (0.1110) (0.1093) (0.1087) 
Cash-only initial offer -0.2028** -0.1683* -0.1817** -0.1811** -0.1781** 
 (0.0855) (0.0910) (0.0877) (0.0871) (0.0843) 
Recently exchange-listed -0.1416 -0.1114 -0.1140 -0.1237 -0.0882 
 (0.0921) (0.0884) (0.0875) (0.0874) (0.0870) 
Stock volatility -3.0137 -2.5957 -2.9865 -3.0151 -1.5181 
 (4.4643) (4.5914) (4.4707) (4.4759) (4.3690) 
Cash-to-assets ratio 0.1471 0.1623 0.2094 0.0137 -0.0938 
 (0.3960) (0.4257) (0.3811) (0.4060) (0.3932) 
ln(Firm size) -0.1247*** -0.1366*** -0.1420*** -0.1319*** -0.1316*** 
 (0.0370) (0.0345) (0.0362) (0.0357) (0.0367) 
Leverage 0.5708** 0.5723** 0.6046** 0.6172*** 0.5180** 
 (0.2407) (0.2335) (0.2359) (0.2384) (0.2531) 
Asset-turnover ratio -0.1024* -0.1010** -0.1067** -0.1058** -0.1013* 
 (0.0526) (0.0511) (0.0531) (0.0521) (0.0542) 
Stock performance -0.2373 -0.2132 -0.1780 -0.2162 -0.1558 
 (0.1569) (0.1525) (0.1508) (0.1523) (0.1357) 
Market-to-book ratio 0.1329 0.1192 0.1226 0.1269 0.1662** 
 (0.0822) (0.0776) (0.0789) (0.0797) (0.0779) 
CEO age -0.0096 -0.1298    
 (0.0066) (0.0978)    
CEO age2  0.0012    
  (0.0009)    
ln(CEO age)   -0.4668 -0.4677 -0.4545 
   (0.3253) (0.3298) (0.3112) 
CEO stockholding -0.0065 -0.0440  -0.0456 -0.0661** 
 (0.0098) (0.0284)  (0.0302) (0.0287) 
CEO stockholding2  0.0014  0.0015 0.0022* 
  (0.0012)  (0.0012) (0.0012) 
ln(1 + CEO stockholding)   -0.1121*   
   (0.0637)   
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Table 10 (continued) 
Effect of frustrating action on the likelihood of CEO turnover after a hostile bid: standard likelihood model 
Bid or target-firm 
characteristic 
CEO turnover 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Directors’ aggregate 
stockholding -0.0026 -0.0038    
 (0.0059) (0.0200)    
Directors’ aggregate 
stockholding2  0.0000    
  (0.0003)    
ln(1 + Directors’ aggregate 
stockholding)   0.0095 -0.0009 0.0078 
   (0.0675) (0.0633) (0.0644) 
Outside and reputable board 
chair 0.1130 0.1028 0.1045 0.1084 0.1109 
 (0.0791) (0.0779) (0.0789) (0.0775) (0.0764) 
Board size 0.0606*** 0.0630*** 0.0653*** 0.0652*** 0.0721*** 
 (0.0197) (0.0191) (0.0200) (0.0193) (0.0197) 
Split board 0.0202 0.0213 0.0106 0.0049 -0.0155 
 (0.1333) (0.1315) (0.1331) (0.1346) (0.1446) 
Aggregate outside blockholdings -0.0046* -0.0049** -0.0046** -0.0045** -0.0041* 
 (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
Constant 0.4559*** 0.4550*** 0.4548*** 0.4551*** 0.4533*** 
 (0.0322) (0.0315) (0.0317) (0.0319) (0.0308) 
Controls for then primary 
industries of target firms Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for announcement 
years of hostile bids Yes Yes Yes No No 
Chi2 statistic 56.90** 86.12*** 56.42** 58.25** 54.81** 
Pseudo R2-statistic 37.24 38.90 38.57 38.19 41.59 




Effect of frustrating action on the likelihood of CEO turnover after a hostile bid: IV likelihood model 
This table presents results (average marginal effects induced by a one-unit change in each of the variables) from an 
instrumental variable (IV) probit regression for the likelihood of CEO turnover after a hostile bid, wherein frustrating action 
is treated as a potentially suspect endogenous variable, and by otherwise replicating the standard regression in Column (4) of 
Table 10. Since frustrating action is a binary variable, probabilities of frustrating action are intermediately estimated from a 
probit regression for the likelihood that it is managers’ preferable resistance strategy. This intermediate regression in Column 
(1) of this table includes all the other variables, and controls, in the standard regression. In addition, the post-Cadbury variable 
is exploited as a naturally exogenous source of variation for estimating the probabilities of frustrating action. Post-Cadbury is 
a binary variable for whether or not it is mandatory for the target firm to comply with the Cadbury reforms of internal 
corporate-governance practice before bid rumors. The estimated probabilities of frustrating action are then used as an 
instrumental variable in the IV regression in Column (2) of this table. Because of the intermediate regression, the first-stage 
of the IV regression is not tabulated. Maximum likelihood is used to generate the results. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Bid or target-firm characteristic 
Frustrating action CEO turnover 
(1) (2) 
Frustrating action (now-instrumented)  0.3885*** 
  (0.1323) 
Multiple bidders -0.3443*** -0.0587 
 (0.0539) (0.0968) 
Failed bid -0.0800 -0.3996*** 
 (0.0768) (0.0725) 
Initial premium 0.4539*** 0.0103 
 (0.1137) (0.1100) 
Cash-only initial offer -0.2004*** -0.1616* 
 (0.0658) (0.0905) 
Recently exchange-listed -0.4364*** -0.0769 
 (0.0276) (0.1038) 
Stock volatility -7.4027* -2.1451 
 (3.9973) (4.4153) 
Cash-to-assets ratio -0.4971* 0.0030 
 (0.2920) (0.3997) 
ln(Firm size) 0.0150 -0.1284*** 
 (0.0316) (0.0359) 
Leverage 0.2928 0.5809** 
 (0.2253) (0.2357) 
Asset-turnover ratio -0.1748*** -0.0914* 
 (0.0464) (0.0552) 
Stock performance -0.1070 -0.2045 
 (0.1112) (0.1517) 
Market-to-book ratio 0.0410 0.1397* 
 (0.1039) (0.0791) 
ln(CEO age) 0.5417* -0.5187 
 (0.2786) (0.3203) 
CEO stockholding 0.0541* -0.0465 
 (0.0305) (0.0288) 
CEO stockholding2 -0.0008 0.0014 
 (0.0011) (0.0012) 
ln(1 + Directors’ aggregate stockholding) -0.2426*** 0.0091 
 (0.0747) (0.0644) 
Outside and reputable board chair -0.2404*** 0.1217 
 (0.0636) (0.0750) 
Board size -0.0803*** 0.0633*** 
 (0.0282) (0.0190) 
Split board -0.3022*** 0.0429 
 (0.0772) (0.1358) 
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Table 11 (continued) 
Effect of frustrating action on the likelihood of CEO turnover after a hostile bid: IV likelihood model 
Bid or target-firm characteristic 
Frustrating action CEO turnover 
(1) (2) 
Aggregate outside blockholdings -0.0093*** -0.0041* 
 (0.0022) (0.0023) 
Post-Cadbury 0.5636***  
 (0.0443)  
Constant 0.4387*** 0.4573*** 
 (0.0262) (0.0315) 
Controls for then primary industries of target firms Yes Yes 
Chi2 statistic 552.28*** 66.63*** 
Pseudo R2-statistic 57.55  
Chi2 test of endogeneity  0.79 
Observations 119 119 
 
